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The most significant and powerful hazard that exists in an underground coal mine 
is a coal dust explosion. A coal dust explosion has the potential to propagate throughout a 
mine resulting in massive damage to the mine and equipment, as well as tragic loss of 
life. An assessment of current global regulations and practices uncovered four main 
control methods utilized to prevent coal dust explosions in coal mines world-wide. The 
United States is one of the few countries that does not regulate or employ all four of these 
safety practices. Additionally, a review of past research into coal dust explosions and 
their prevention and mitigation uncovered scientific need for the use of explosion barriers 
as an additional line of defense against deadly coal dust explosions since the early 1900s. 
This research project was developed to investigate the possibility of implementing the 
fourth prevention strategy in the United States, the use of explosion activated barriers as 
the last line of defense against the propagation of a coal dust explosion. 
The goal of this thesis was twofold. The first component was to demonstrate that 
explosion impulse, as opposed to explosion pressure, is the primary factor in the 
complete operation of the bag barrier system; meaning the rupturing of the bag, the 
release of the contained stone dust, and the dispersal of the released dust. The second 
component was to demonstrate that the bag barrier system can be effectively 
implemented into American underground coal mines. This goal was achieved through the 
careful examination and analysis of historical mine explosions and mine explosion 
prevention research, explosive testing of the bag barrier system, and trial bag barrier 





To my wife Jennifer, and son David, for their unwavering confidence, love, 
support, and encouragement. To my parents, Ann and Robert, for all the love, support, 























I would like to acknowledge the efforts of Dr. Catherine E. Johnson, and express 
my deepest gratitude. Without her leadership, guidance, insights, assistance, inspiration, 
and most of all her patience, the completion of this project and my master’s degree would 
not have been possible. 
I would like to thank Dr. David Humphreys, and Mr. Terry O’Beirne from 
Skillpro Services of Queensland, Australia. Their expertise and years of experience, 
research, and development with the bag barrier product, along with the wealth of 
information, insights, and guidance that this afforded, were instrumental to the project. 
I would like to thank the Running Right Leadership and Conference Center, Arch 
Coal, Inc., and the engineering and production crews at the Beckley, Leer, Mountain 
Laurel, Sentinel, and West Elk mines for their support of the project. 
A special thanks to Mrs. Kathleen Morris, Dr. Stewart Gillies, Mr. Jeff Heniff and 
Mr. Jacob Brinkman for their assistance and support with various aspects of the project. 
I would like to thank the members of my advisory committee, Dr. Braden Lusk 
and Dr. Kyle Perry, for their time and efforts in relation to this project and my general 
education. 
This study was sponsored by the Alpha Foundation for the Improvement of Mine 
Safety and Health, Inc. (ALPHA FOUNDATION). The views, opinions and 
recommendations expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not imply any 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
    Page 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. v 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .............................................................................................. x 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ xii 
NOMENCLATURE ........................................................................................................ xiii 
SECTION 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................. 1 
1.2. RESEARCH APPROACH .............................................................................. 2 
1.2.1. Operation of Bag Type Passive Explosion Barriers. .............................. 3 
1.2.2. Implementation of Bag Type Passive Explosion Barriers in 
    U.S. Coal Mines ...................................................................................... 4 
1.2.3. Required Changes or Improvements for Use of Bag Type Explosion 
    Barriers in U.S. Coal Mines .................................................................... 4 
2. BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................... 6 
2.1. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW ....................................................................... 6 
2.2. HISTORY OF COAL MINING AND RELATED EXPLOSIONS 
       IN THE UNITED STATES ............................................................................. 7 
2.3. HISTORY OF FOREIGN COAL MINE EXPLOSION DISASTERS ......... 12 
2.4. HISTORY OF U.S. COAL MINE EXPLOSION PREVENTION 
       RESEARCH AND STRATEGIES ................................................................ 16 
2.5. CURRENT COAL DUST EXPLOSION PREVENTION 
                   STRATEGIES WORLDWIDE ..................................................................... 33 
vii 
 
2.5.1. U.S. Mines and Their Current Practices ............................................... 35 
2.5.2. Foreign Mines and Their Current Practices. ......................................... 36 
2.6. STONE DUST BARRIER HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
       TESTING ....................................................................................................... 38 
2.7. HIGH EXPLOSIVES TESTING ................................................................... 43 
2.8. SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 52 
3. OPERATION OF BAG TYPE PASSIVE EXPLOSION BARRIERS .................. 55 
3.1. BAG BARRIER TESTING OVERVIEW ..................................................... 55 
3.2. OPEN AIR TESTS ........................................................................................ 56 
3.2.1. Open Air Testing Method ..................................................................... 56 
3.2.2. Open Air Testing Results ...................................................................... 60 
3.2.3. Open Air Testing Analysis.................................................................... 61 
3.3. SHOCK TUNNEL TESTS ............................................................................ 67 
3.3.1. Shock Tunnel Pressure Testing Method ............................................... 68 
3.3.2. Shock Tunnel Barrier Bag Testing Procedure ...................................... 70 
3.3.3. Shock Tunnel Testing Results .............................................................. 70 
3.3.4. Shock Tunnel Testing Analysis ............................................................ 71 
3.4. SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 74 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF BAG TYPE PASSIVE EXPLOSION 
    BARRIERS IN U.S COAL MINES ....................................................................... 76 
4.1. MINE SITE TRIAL INSTALLATION OVERVIEW ................................... 76 
4.2. BAG BARRIER INSTALLATIONS ............................................................ 77 
4.2.1. Trial at Mine #1 .................................................................................... 77 
4.2.2. Trial at Mine #2 .................................................................................... 83 
viii 
 
4.3. SURVEY RESULTS ..................................................................................... 87 
4.3.1. Preliminary Survey ............................................................................... 87 
4.3.2. Post-Installation Survey ........................................................................ 88 
4.3.3. Follow-Up Survey ................................................................................. 90 
4.3.4. Analysis of Mine Surveys ..................................................................... 94 
4.4. BARRIER BAG MOISTURE INTRUSION STUDY .................................. 94 
4.4.1. Year-Long Study at Missouri S&T ....................................................... 95 
4.4.2. Results of Missouri S&T Moisture Intrusion Study ............................. 95 
4.4.3. Analysis of Moisture Intrusion Study Data .......................................... 98 
4.5. SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 101 
5. REQUIRED CHANGES OR IMPROVEMENTS FOR USE OF BAG 
    TYPE EXPLOSION BARRIERS IN U.S. COAL MINES .................................. 104 
5.1. OVERVIEW OF REQUIRED CHANGES ................................................. 104 
5.2. BAG BARRIER SYSTEM LAYOUT OR DESIGN CHANGES .............. 104 
5.2.1. Coal Seam and Mining Height Differences ........................................ 105 
5.2.2. Roof Support System Differences ...................................................... 106 
5.2.3. Mine Type and Layout Differences .................................................... 107 
5.2.4. Ventilation System Differences .......................................................... 110 
5.3. SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 112 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT .............................................. 114 
6.1. PROJECT OVERVIEW .............................................................................. 114 
6.2. PROJECT IMPACTS .................................................................................. 115 
6.2.1. Objective 1: Operation of Bag Type Passive Explosion 
    Barriers ................................................................................................ 115 
ix 
 
6.2.2. Objective 2: Implementation of Bag Type Passive Explosion 
    Barriers in U.S Coal Mines ................................................................. 117 
6.2.3. Objective 3: Required Changes or Improvements for Use of 
    Bag Type Explosion Barriers in U.S. Coal Mines .............................. 119 
6.3. PROJECT CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................ 120 
6.4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK ...................................... 123 
APPENDICES 
A. MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT UTILIZED IN OPEN AIR                                                      
TESTING OF BARRIER BAGS ........................................................................ 124 
B. PRESSURE TRANSDUCER WAVEFORMS AND GRAPHS ........................ 127 
 
C. PHOTOGRAPHS OF BARRIER BAG DAMAGE INCURRED 
DURING TESTING ........................................................................................... 136 
 
D. MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT UTILIZED IN SHOCK TUNNEL 
TESTING OF BARRIER BAGS ........................................................................ 143 
 
E. PRESSURE AND IMPULSE DATA FROM SHOCK TUNNEL 
TESTING ............................................................................................................ 146 
 
F. BAG BARRIER SUPPLIES CALCULATOR SHEETS ................................... 148 
 
G. ENDING LIMESTONE DUST MOISTURE CONTENT 
ANALYSIS OF ALL 35 BAGS ......................................................................... 152 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 155 









LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
    Page 
Figure 2.1: U.S. Coal Mine Explosion Fatalities and Major Prevention Milestones ........ 16 
Figure 2.2: Comparison of Bagged Stone Dust Barrier Specifications for the 
                   United Kingdom, Republic of South Africa, and New South Wales[35] ........ 39  
Figure 2.3: Bag Testing in Shock Tunnel at Kloppersbos Testing Facility ...................... 40 
Figure 2.4: Bag Explosion Testing at Kloppersbos Testing Facility ................................ 41 
Figure 2.5: Stone Dust Filled Bag and Hook Hanging from Test Stand[35] ...................... 42 
Figure 2.6: Pressure vs Time Graph[39] ............................................................................. 45 
Figure 2.7: Pressure-Distance Relationship[38] ................................................................. 46 
Figure 2.8: PCB Piezotronics Pencil Probe Pressure Transducer[41] ................................ 47 
Figure 2.9: PCB Piezotronics Surface Mount Pressure Transducer[42] ............................. 47 
Figure 2.10: Pressure-Impulse Diagram[38] ....................................................................... 50 
Figure 2.11: Pressure-Impulse Damage Curve with Sensitivities Labeled[51] .................. 50 
Figure 2.12: Interaction of Reflected and Incident Shock Waves[39] ................................ 51 
Figure 2.13: Realistic Pressure -Time Graph .................................................................... 52 
Figure 3.1: View of Typical Test Stand, Pressure Sensor, and Barrier Bag Setup ........... 57 
Figure 3.2: View of Test Site Setup Illustrating the Test Stand Order and  
                   Position about a Simulated Charge ................................................................ 58 
Figure 3.3: 240g Charge Hung with Blasting Cap and Trigger Wire ............................... 59 
Figure 3.4: Open Air Bag Barrier Testing Pressure-Impulse versus Bag Damage .......... 62 
Figure 3.5: Picture Showing Typical Pattern of Dropped Stone Dust .............................. 64 
Figure 3.6: Picture Showing Split in Bag Typical at Greater Distances ........................... 65 
Figure 3.7: Picture Showing the Shredding of Bags Typical at Lesser Distances ............ 66 
Figure 3.8: Fabricated Steel Shock Tunnel Used for Barrier Bag Testing ....................... 67 
xi 
 
Figure 3.9: Dimensional Drawing of Fabricated Steel Shock Tunnel[43].......................... 68 
Figure 3.10: Picture Showing Bag Shredding and Dust Dispersal Typical of 
                     Shock Tunnel Testing .................................................................................. 73  
Figure 3.11: Combined Bag Barrier Testing Pressure-Impulse versus Damage .............. 74 
Figure 4.1: Damage to Bags from Packing and Shipping to Mine ................................... 77 
Figure 4.2: Hook Types Examined for Mounting Alternatives ........................................ 78 
Figure 4.3: Bolt Plate/Cable Support Method................................................................... 79 
Figure 4.4: Cable and Hook Support Method ................................................................... 80 
Figure 4.5: Rubber Coated Cable Hanger Support Method .............................................. 80 
Figure 4.6: Scoop Car versus Bag Barrier Clearance ....................................................... 81 
Figure 4.7: Barrier Installation Location Mine #1 ............................................................ 82 
Figure 4.8: Miner Hanging Bag from 8 Foot Ladder........................................................ 83 
Figure 4.9: Barrier Bag Hung from Roof Mesh ................................................................ 84 
Figure 4.10: Scoop Car and Miner Clearance with Barrier Bags ..................................... 85 
Figure 4.11: Trial Barrier Installation Location Mine #2 ................................................. 86 
Figure 4.12: Modified Closure/Hook Design Suggestion ................................................ 90 
Figure 4.13: Missouri S&T Bag Barrier Layout ............................................................... 96 
Figure 4.14: Ending (1 Year) Moisture Content of all 35 Bags ...................................... 100 
Figure 4.15: Moisture Content over Time of 7 Test Bags .............................................. 101 
Figure 5.1: Bag Barrier Locations for an Example Room and Pillar Mine .................... 109 
Figure 5.2: Bag Barrier Locations for an Example Longwall Panel ............................... 111 
Figure 5.3: Bag Barrier Locations for an Example Longwall Panel, Including 




LIST OF TABLES 
                   Page 
Table 1.1: Project Objectives .............................................................................................. 3 
Table 2.1: First Coal Mining and First Explosions by States[2] ........................................ 10 
Table 2.2: Australian Coal Mine Explosion Disasters[48] ................................................. 13 
Table 2.3: New Zealand Coal Mine Explosion Disasters[49]............................................. 14 
Table 2.4: British and Irish Coal Mine Explosion Disasters[50] ........................................ 15 
Table 3.1: Max Pressure, Impulse, and Bag Rupture Comparison ................................... 60 
Table 3.2: Pressure Transducer to Charge Distance in Tunnel ......................................... 69 
Table 3.3: Barrier Bag Damage versus Distance, Pressure, and Impulse ......................... 71 
Table 4.1: Preliminary Survey Results ............................................................................. 88 
Table 4.2: Post-Installation Survey Results ...................................................................... 89 
Table 4.3: Mine Site Management Survey ....................................................................... 92 
Table 4.4: Combined Mine Site Labor Survey ................................................................. 92 













# Mesh A sieve having said number (#) of wires per inch, a higher # 
mesh has finer wire and smaller opening sizes 
 
Afterdamp Toxic gases developed during methane and coal dust 
explosions and remain afterwards 
 
BEM Bruceton Experimental Mine 
Bleeder or 
Bleeder Entry  
Mine entries utilized for allowing ventilation into the gob/goaf 
behind the longwall panel to reduce methane accumulations 
 
USBM United States Bureau of Mines 
C4 A high yield chemical explosive compound comprised of 
RDX, a binder, a plasticizer, and a marker or taggant chemical 
 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
Coal Dust Fine coal particles produced during the mining and 
transportation processes 
 
CSIR Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 
Davy, Clanny, or 
Stephenson Lamps 
Types of flame safety lamps used by miners for light in the 
mines that reduced the open flame's ability to ignite methane 
gas 
 
Face Part of mine where actual mining occurs via longwall shear or 
continuous miner, where the machine liberates the ore 
 
Firedamp Methane Gas 
Flue Dust Ash from the flue or chimney of a coal or wood furnace 
G or g Grams 
Gate-road Mine development road at either end of the longwall panel 
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Gob or Goaf Region behind the advancement of the longwall panel that is 
allowed to collapse or subside from lack of support  
Headgate The gate-road at the beginning of the longwall shear's path, 
nearest to the intake developments 
 
Inby or Inbye The direction that goes deeper into the mine from a given 
location 
Intake Airway Mine entry used for incoming fresh air distribution 
Kg or kg Kilograms 
KPA or kPa Kilo Pascals 
MESA Mine Enforcement Administration 
Mine Working Mine entry or tunnel 
psi*ms A unit of impulse, the integral of a pressure versus time curve, 
pounds per square inch milliseconds 
 
MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration 
Neutral Airway Mine entry used for conveyor belt routing, usually between the 
intake and return entries 
 
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
NSW New South Wales 
NZ New Zealand 
Outby or Outbye The direction that goes toward the mine opening from a given 
location 
 
Panel Large section of mine surrounded by developments and left to 
be mined via a longwall method 
 
Penitent or Cannoneer Miner charged with locating and igniting methane pockets in 
the mine to burn off small gas accumulations 
 




PSI or psi Pounds per square inch 
Quick Flaming 
Explosives 




An organic explosive compound used primarily by military. 
Also known as cyclonite, hexogen, or trimethylenetrinitramine 
 
Return Airway Mine entry used to return the contaminated air to outside the 
mine 
Rock Dust or Stone 
Dust 
Pulverized limestone or shale rocks 
Rock Dusting or Stone 
Dusting 
The practice of the widespread distribution or 'dusting' of the 
coal mine floor, walls, and ceiling with pulverized rock dusts 
 
RSA Republic of South Africa 
Sackcloth Cloth sacks of a relatively fine weave so to contain the various 
food staples that were supplied and delivered in them 
 
Seals or Stoppings Walls built in place in a mine after development and hitched 
into the floor, walls, and roof. Can be temporary or permanent 
 
Shooting Using explosives to liberate ore in a mine 
Tailgate The gate-road at the end of the longwall shear's path, nearest to 
the return developments 
 
TIC Total Incombustible Content - a measure of the % of 
incombustible content of a sample of accumulated dust from a 
coal mine 
 
U.S. United States of America 
UBB Upper Big Branch 
UK United Kingdom 
USGS United States Geological Survey 




1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The most significant and powerful hazard that exists in an underground coal mine 
is a coal dust explosion. A coal dust explosion has the potential to propagate to every part 
of a mine and result in massive damage to the mine and equipment, as well as tragic loss 
of life. Since 2001, disasters due to coal dust explosions in U.S. underground coal mines 
have caused 59 deaths, including 29 deaths in a single mine explosion at the West 
Virginia Upper Big Branch (UBB) mine in 2010. Many controls have been developed 
and implemented in different countries to reduce the impact of coal dust explosions.  
One of the most significant health and safety interventions in use internationally is 
the “Bag Barrier” passive explosion barrier. Both active and passive barrier systems have 
been developed and are on the market, but the bag barrier system is the most common 
due to ease of installation and lower costs. Though various explosion barrier types have 
been in use in other countries for over 15 years, their use has not been adopted in the 
United States. This is due to the false belief that good housekeeping and other 
preventative strategies (such as the practice of “rock dusting”) will always be 100% 
effective. Following the UBB disaster, many have realized that additional defenses are 
needed to prevent the propagation of a methane ignition into a coal dust explosion. From 
a risk management viewpoint, the explosion barriers are a supplemental and final 
contingency control for the rare occasion when one or more of the employed prevention 
strategies is insufficient or fails to stop the propagation of the explosion. Research and 
revised guidelines specific to U.S. mines are needed to demonstrate the practical 




safeguards, to prevent explosion propagations. The research presented in this thesis 
investigates the operation of the bagged stone dust barrier system, the possibilities of 
implementing the bagged stone dust style of explosion barrier into U.S. underground coal 
mines, and any modifications or design changes required for their implementation. 
1.2. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The approach taken with this project is qualitative through visual analysis of the 
bag barrier performance as well as survey analysis of mine workers in proximity to the 
bag barrier system to define design changes that would encourage the bag barrier system 
use in the United States.  Additionally, quantitative research was performed through open 
air and shock tunnel explosives testing and data analysis, and a year-long moisture 
intrusion study. Extensive research has been completed on the use of the bag barrier type 
of explosion barrier by the manufacturer and the performance of this barrier system has 
been comprehensively tested and demonstrated by numerous mines in Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Poland, and the United Kingdom. The primary challenges to the 
implementation of this technology in the United States is to change the current mining 
culture and refine existing regulations, or develop new guidelines, for the design and 
installation of bag barriers in U.S. coal mines. Additional challenges include mines where 
the mining height may be low or the bleeder returns off the longwall face present unique 
explosion suppression issues.   
This project was primarily developed to address the technical aspects of the 
implementation of the bag barrier system into underground coal mines in America, and to 
define any necessary modifications for their use.  This goal was divided into 3 main 
objectives (Table 1.1). Each of these main objectives were comprised of a various 
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number of tasks required to attain their respective goal. A brief synopsis of the over-
arching purpose of, and approach to, each objective is given in this section. A detailed 
description and explanation of each objective and its sub-tasks are contained in their 
respective sections (Sections 3, 4, and 5) within this Thesis. 
 
Table 1.1: Project Objectives 
 
 
1.2.1. Operation of Bag Type Passive Explosion Barriers. The purpose of this objective was 
to understand the principle operational characteristics of the bag type passive explosion 
barriers. The tasks required to complete this objective involved specifically designed 
experiments to test the bags’ response to various levels of pressure and pressure over 
time, defined as impulse. The testing performed during this project utilized high 
explosive charges to produce the various levels of pressure and impulse that the barrier 
bags were subjected to. This was done to obtain the pressure and impulse levels required 
for bag rupture, but without the heat, turbulence, and movement of large volumes of air 
and hot gasses that would be observed with a methane gas explosion. The purpose for this 
distinction is so that the bag rupture characteristics could be studied separately from the 
distribution of the contained stone dust. This differentiation was imperative to 
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understanding the value that each component of a coal dust explosion (pressure, impulse, 
and air movement) have on the operation of the bagged stone dust type passive explosion 
barrier system. 
1.2.2. Implementation of Bag Type Passive Explosion Barriers in U.S. Coal 
Mines.  The purpose of this objective was to understand the inherent physical difficulties 
and obstructions to the installation and possible implementation of the bag type passive 
explosion barrier systems into U.S. coal mines. Two mines of differing heights and 
configurations, representing a wide cross-section of U.S. coal mines were selected to 
perform scaled-length trial bag barrier installations. The barriers were installed in entries 
ahead of major development, and left in place for a period of time so the miners would 
experience working around them during the normal progression of mining activities. 
After a period of time, mine site staff were surveyed on their experiences working around 
the barriers, insights into any problems experienced or foreseen, and concerns that may 
have arisen from their interactions with, or observations of, the barriers. This objective 
provided first-hand knowledge and experience with the installation of a bag barrier in 
American coal mines, which was necessary to prove that it was not only possible, but 
quite feasible. 
1.2.3. Required Changes or Improvements for Use of Bag Type Explosion 
Barriers in U.S. Coal Mines.  The purpose of this objective was to assess the need for 
any changes or improvements, required by either the mines or the barriers, for the 
implementation and use of such barriers on a full scale and long-term basis in 
underground coal mines in the United States. This objective was needed to explore 
whether the regulations currently used in other countries were comprehensive enough to 
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account for differences between foreign and American coal mines. This objective was 
approached on three fronts. First, through a complete review of regulations pertaining to 
coal mining and explosion prevention strategies utilized in countries that employ 
explosion barriers and those of the United States. Second, by involving two consultants, 
Dr. David Humphreys and Mr. Terry O’Beirne of Skillpro Services Pty. Ltd.  They have 
a great deal of experience and knowledge in the research, development, and 
implementation of bag barriers in other countries. The third front was incorporating 
feedback obtained through various means from a variety of coal industry laborers, 
professionals, executives, regulators, and researchers. The information gleaned from the 
many discussions, meetings, and presentations with countless people, in addition to that 
gained from the Australian consultants, was utilized to assess and outline the changes 















2.1. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW 
The background research required for the completion of this project was diverse. 
To be comprehensive, it started with the history of coal mining and coal mine explosions 
in the United States (Section 2.2.). This was followed by reviewing the history of coal 
mine explosion prevention research and strategies (Section 2.3.). This historical 
examination, and the contained knowledge became the foundation upon which the 
remainder of the project was based. This review continued with a look at current 
practices utilized in coal mines within the United States and abroad (Section 2.4.). The 
assessment of the current practices uncovered four main coal dust explosion prevention 
strategies in use around the globe. However, the United States only uses three of these 
four strategies. The fourth strategy that is not utilized in the United States is the use of 
explosion barriers; even though all earlier research performed in the United States and 
abroad indicates the need for this extra level of protection. 
During the review of foreign coal mining regulations and practices, the 
requirement for the use of explosion barriers was predominant. The type of explosion 
barrier to be used was not dictated, but many regulations had included sections, or 
separate documents, outlining the use of a bagged stone dust type of explosion barrier. 
The history, development, and testing of these bag barriers was researched and evaluated 
(Section 2.5.). Finally, the barrier bags themselves would be tested further to understand 
and outline their operational characteristics. This testing was to be performed using high 
explosive charges in open and confined testing arrangements, so the applicable aspects of 
explosive testing and shock and pressure propagation were studied (Section 2.6.).  
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2.2. HISTORY OF COAL MINING AND RELATED EXPLOSIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
As long as there have been underground coal mines, there have been explosions 
fueled by the gas and dust released within them. These explosions have caused the injury 
and death of many miners and the destruction of mine workings in all countries where the 
fuel source is mined. The first reported coal mine explosion in the United States occurred 
in Virginia in 1810[1]. Though mining, ventilation, and prevention equipment and 
practices have improved greatly over the past 200 years, coal mine explosions have 
unfortunately continued in the United States up until the latest example in 2010 in West 
Virginia[2]. 
Coal mining in the United States dates back to early settlers. Initially wood was 
plentiful and easily obtained, with only limited quantities of coal being converted to 
charcoal for special purposes. In 1702, coal obtained from the outcrops along the James 
River in Virginia was mined for use in blacksmith forges[2]. The digging of coal for local 
use at this location continued for fifty plus years before the product began to be heavily 
mined and shipped via the river. In 1760, another mine was developed near Richmond, 
Virginia called Heath’s Pits. 
By 1810 at least three of the shafts being worked at Heath’s Pits were 300 feet 
deep. At this depth problems with current ventilation techniques began to occur and 
pockets of methane gas (then called firedamp) would form explosive mixtures in poorly 
ventilated mine workings[2]. Additionally, the miners of the time would use open flame 
lamps mounted to their helmets for light to work by while employing black powder and 
dynamite to break the rock and coal. With the combination of an open flame lamp at the 
highest point on a miner’s body, the use of large fireball producing explosives, and the 
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collection of explosive mixtures of methane that are lighter than air and collect at the 
high points in the mine workings, gas explosions were imminent. 
Even with the use of the newly developed Flame Safety Lamp in 1815, explosions 
continued to occur. Many explosions still occurred from open flames due to the miners 
removing the wire mesh covers from their safety lamps. They did this because it limited 
the light output of the lamp[2]. Additionally, many mines were reserved to using older 
methods of locating methane pockets using open flames, and igniting the accumulations 
intentionally. 
As the population of the United States began to sprawl along with the 
transportation system, so did the number of coal mines in the various coal-producing 
regions in the United States; such as the Powder River Basin, Illinois Basin, and 
Appalachian regions. As these mines progressed toward larger production capabilities, 
the number of coal mine explosions in those regions also increased. This is supported by 
examining the time interval between when mining began and when production began 
compared to the date of the first explosion. In states where mine production began before 
1820, an average of 75 years passed before their first coal mine explosion. In states where 
mining production began between 1820 and 1850, an average of 60 years passed before 
their first coal mine explosion. In states that began mine production after 1850, the 
average time before a mine explosion had decreased to 20 years[2]. The shrinking time 
interval between the beginning of production and the first explosion indicates the 
increased rate at which coal mines were being developed to a stage favorable to such 




Moreover, this theory is solidified by looking at the production values over the 
same time period. For example, when coal production began in Colorado in 1864, the 
annual production was a mere 500 tons per year. By 1869 it had increased to 10,000 tons 
per year, and by 1875 it had reached 100,000 tons per year. When the first deadly 
explosion occurred in 1883, the production output was over 1.25 million tons[2]. Table 2.1 
displays the dates of first coal mining activities, first production mining activities, and the 
first deadly explosions by state.  
In addition to the increased occurrence of coal mine explosions was an increase in 
the number of miners killed. From 1839 to 1890, 43 coal mine explosions occurred, 
killing 851 miners[3]. In the following 10 years (1891 through 1900), the occurrence of 
coal mine explosions continued to increase with 38 coal mine explosions killing 1,024 
miners, and between the years of 1901 and 1910 their occurrence over tripled, with 111 
coal mines experiencing explosions that killed 3,321 miners[3]. The public outcry over the 
sharp increase in coal mine explosions and the loss of life incurred, forced the U.S. 
Congress to act. 
Until this point, in the United States it was believed that the ignition of methane 
gas, or firedamp, was the primary cause of coal mine explosions. However, the part that 
the coal dusts (created by the mining practices used in liberating the coal from the 
ground) was playing in the frequency, magnitude, and devastating results of coal mine 
explosions, was being questioned due to research recently performed in Europe along 
with recent coal mine explosions occurring in dry, dusty, non-gassy mines[2]. This theory 
regarding the involvement of coal dusts in coal mine explosions had been a hot topic in 
Europe for some time[5]. 
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Table 2.1: First Coal Mining and First Explosions by States[2] 
 
 
During the five-year period from the inception of the Bureau of Mines in late 
1910 through 1915, another 45 coal mine explosions occurred killing another 1,546 
miners. From 1916 through 1920, the number of explosions declined to 37, while the 
death toll from those explosions declined to 601. The trend of large death tolls due to coal 
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mine explosions continued between 1921 and 1925 with 50 explosions resulting in the 
death of 1,329 miners. These numbers spiked between 1925 and 1930 with 54 explosions 
resulting in 1,794 deaths. With recent United States Bureau of Mines (USBM) research 
released in 1927 recommending the use of the Taffanel rock dust explosion barriers or the 
American ”Rice” versions located strategically in the mines, in addition to the 
recommended general dusting of the mine, the explosion occurrence and death toll 
greatly declined in the 1930s. The period of 1930 through 1935 saw only 16 explosions 
resulting in 247 deaths. While the period from 1936 through 1940 saw 21 explosions and 
521 deaths. The decreased numbers in the early 1930s occurred as many mines were shut 
down temporarily or closed permanently during the Great Depression[2]. 
The period between 1941 and 1950 saw a continual decrease in the number of 
explosions and death tolls. From 1941 through 1945, there were 26 explosions and 440 
deaths, while from 1946 through 1950, there were 11 explosions and 238 deaths. During 
the period of 1951 through 1955, there were only 8 explosions that killed 184 miners. 
The death toll continued to decrease over the next five years (1956 -1960) with 9 
explosions and 121 deaths[3]. Things remained largely unchanged for the next decade, 
with 8 explosions and 122 deaths from 1961 through 1965, and 4 explosions and 132 
deaths between 1966 and 1970[3]. 
The following decade, from 1971 through 1980, saw a drastic decline with only 4 
explosion disasters and 36 related deaths[3]. Additional regulatory changes also occurred 
during this time frame. In the decades since the inception of the Mine Act (1977), the 
occurrence of coal mine explosions has greatly decreased. Between 1981 and 1990, 6 
explosions caused the death of 60 miners. Between 1991 and 2000, only 1 coal mine 
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explosion occurred resulting in the death of 8 miners. The early 2000s saw a resurgence 
of coal mine explosions with 4 disasters killing 59 miners[3]. This spike in explosions and 
deaths is possibly attributed to the complacency of a newer generation of miners, mine 
managers, and mine inspectors that had not been in the industry during the previous 
decades of frequent explosion disasters, and were therefore not sufficiently aware of the 
dangers of coal dust explosions. It is also possible that hard economic times for the coal 
industry had forced some mine managers to cut corners, resulting in the unsafe conditions 
that lead to explosions disasters. It is quite likely a product of both. 
Though the frequency of coal mine explosion disasters has subsided and the 
resulting death tolls have dramatically decreased, the risk of coal dust explosions has not 
disappeared. Additionally, though their frequency and human costs have decreased over 
time, the economic costs of a coal mine explosion and loss of production can still cause 
the demise of even the strongest coal mining company. Such was the case with the 
holding company for the Upper Big Branch mine, Massey Coal, due to the most recent 
explosion in U.S. history in 2010. This further highlights the economic risks of coal dust 
explosions, in excess of the risks to human life. This also shows that even in these 
modern times, coal dust explosion tragedies continue to occur, albeit less frequently 
despite the regulations and practices currently in use.  
2.3. HISTORY OF FOREIGN COAL MINE EXPLOSION DISASTERS 
Coal mine explosions are not unique to the American coal mining industry. They 
have been experienced in all coal mining countries over the years. However, regulatory 
changes have occurred at different times in different countries. For example, stone 
13 
 
dusting became standard practice in the UK in 1920, but Australia did not impose such 
standards until 1941[48]. Table 2.2 lists coal mine explosion disasters for Australia.  
 





The Republic of South Africa has only two reported incidents of coal mine 
explosions in recent history with 68 miners killed in 1983, and 53 miners killed in 1993. 
Coal mine explosions affect large and small mining countries alike. The small country of 
New Zealand is not immune to such tragedies as indicated in Table 2.3. Even larger 
countries with longer coal mining histories, like Great Britain and Ireland, are susceptible 
to coal mine explosion tragedies, as indicated in Table 2.4. Aside from one coal mine 
explosion in New Zealand in 2010, reportedly due to inadequate and careless safety 
practices, there has not been a coal mine explosion in the foreign countries discussed in 
over 20 years, including the time since explosion barriers have been implemented in these 
countries. 
 






Ralph’s Mine, Huntley 1914 43
Dobson Mine 1926 9
Glen Afton Mine 1939 11
Strongman Mine 1967 19
Pike River 2010 29
TOTAL 210
New Zealand Mine Disasters
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Table 2.4: British and Irish Coal Mine Explosion Disasters[50] 
 
Location Year Fatalities
Felling Mine 1812 92
Haswell Colliery 1844 95
Lletty Shenklin Mine 1849 52
Rhondda Colliery 1856 114
Lundhill Colliery 1857 189
Risca Blackvein 1860 146
Oaks Colliery 1866 361
Ferndale Colliery 1867 178
Ferndale Colliery 1869 53
Swaithe Main Colliery 1875 143
Blantyre Colliery 1877 207
Abercarn Colliery 1878 268
Wood Pit Colliery 1878 189
Dinas Rhondda 1879 62
Seaham Colliery 1880 164
New Risca Pit 1880 120
Naval Steam Colliery 1880 101
Clifton Hall Colliery 1885 178
Mardy Colliery 1885 81
Llannerch Colliery 1890 176
Parc Slip Colliery 1892 110
Combs Pit 1893 139
Great Western Mine 1893 63
Albion Colliery 1894 290
Peckfield Colliery 1896 63
Tylorstown 1896 57
East Side Pit 1901 83
National Colliery 1905 119
Maypole Colliery 1908 75
Burns Pit 1909 168
Wellington Colliery 1910 136
Cadeby Coal Mine 1912 88
Minnie Pit 1918 155
Bentley Coal Mine 1931 45
Wharncliffe Woodmoor Colliery 1936 58
Markham Colliery 1938 79
Sneyd Colliery 1942 57
William Pit 1947 104
Easington Colliery 1951 81
Six Bells Colliery 1960 45
Hampton Valley Colliery 1962 16
Tower Colliery 1962 9
Houghton Main 1975 5
Golborne Colliery 1979 10
TOTAL 5024
British and Irish Mine Disasters
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2.4. HISTORY OF U.S. COAL MINE EXPLOSION PREVENTION 
RESEARCH AND STRATEGIES 
In the 300 years since coal mining began in the United States, there have been a 
lot of explosions, and as a result, fatalities as well. The industry went from a period of 
very few explosions in its infancy, to a period of over 900 deaths per year due to 
explosions during its high point, and now has gone back to a period of less than 60 deaths 
due to explosions per decade as seen in Figure 2.1. Though this is a great reduction, any 
loss of life is too much. Therefore, the goal for coal mining explosion fatalities in the 
U.S. is zero. The final period of decreasing coal mine explosions and deaths can be 
attributed to an increased understanding of the phenomena through research, and the 
implementation and enforcement of scientifically based safety standards and protocols.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: U.S. Coal Mine Explosion Fatalities and Major Prevention Milestones 
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Additionally, these changes were implemented during a time of increased coal 
production due to the world’s dependence on coal as an energy source. This fact 
highlights the significance of the changes made, and their effectiveness. So effective at 
reducing fatalities due to coal mine explosions that the Bureau of Mines was closed in 
1995. However, since that time the fatality rate due to coal mine explosions is trending 
back up. This indicates that something has changed and additional safeguards are needed. 
The earliest form of coal mine explosion prevention strategies was the penitent, or 
mine cannoneer. This was a miner who donned a wet sackcloth and crawled into areas of 
the mine suspected to contain accumulations of fire damp with an open flame lamp or 
candle held high. The miner would advance until the flame began to react with the 
firedamp by changing color and emitting small sparks. If the accumulation was not very 
large, the miner would extend his lit candle to ignite the pocket of gas over his body 
while covering his face and body with the wet cloth. If the accumulation was larger, the 
miner would extinguish his candle and retreat to a safe distance and use a device termed 
the “firing line” to pass a light attached to a cord over a wheel at the far end of the 
tunnel[2]. The person entrusted to perform this task, called “trying the candle”, was 
generally one of the more experienced and coolheaded of the miners. The French miners 
called this person ‘The Penitent’ due to the wet cloth resembling the hood of a monk; 
while most referred to this person as the mine’s cannoneer. This procedure and proper 
mine design for natural ventilation were the earliest of explosion prevention strategies[2]. 
As mines got deeper through the 1800s, ventilation became the primary focus of 
explosion prevention strategies. The methods utilized to increase airflow through the 
mine ran the gamut. In one example, large furnaces were built at the bottom of a shaft at 
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one end of the mine to create an updraft in the shaft that pulled air through the mine[2]. A 
more modern approach was a bellows, or fan assembly, belt-driven by a steam engine. In 
1891, the federal government responded to the increasing number of explosions due to 
insufficient ventilation by passing modest legislation that established minimum 
ventilation requirements in coal mines, and also prohibited mines from hiring children 
under the age of 12[4]. 
Another explosion prevention strategy of the time was ignition prevention. The 
early focus for this was the miners’ lamps. Most were using hanging lamps or candles 
with open flames that could ignite flammable gasses[7]. Flame safety lamps, or Davy 
lamps, were invented around 1815 in Europe. The Clanny and Stephenson design safety 
lamps soon followed. The safety lamps gradually made their way to the U.S. along with 
immigrant miners[2]. The remainder of the century saw numerous iterations of the safety 
lamp design by a variety of companies. All incorporated wire mesh to cool the flame, but 
later models had made some improvements. These improvements came in the form of 
glass enclosures around the flame to increase light output, metal bonnets to protect the 
flame from being extinguished by gusts or drafts in the mine, or even gauges to measure 
the methane content of the air by the length of the blue tip of the flame[8]. Though safety 
lamps addressed the gas ignition concerns of an open flame lamp, it was not very popular 
among the miners. Many objected to their use because they were cumbersome and gave 
poor light, which reduced their efficiency. Since most miners were paid by the pound of 
ore that they mined, a reduction in efficiency was the same as a reduction in pay. 
Therefore, the risk of an explosion was a chance that many miners were willing to take. 
Additionally, many miners claimed that safety lamps gave a false sense of security, and 
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were a substitute for the development of better ventilation systems, which most felt were 
desperately needed[9]. 
Nearing the turn of the 20th century, the common belief that all coal mine 
explosions were caused by the ignition of gasses was beginning to change. This change in 
thought was due to many contributing factors. First were the credible accounts of disaster 
witnesses and investigators. Additionally, numerous explosions had recently occurred in 
a grahamite mine in West Virginia, a flour mill in Minneapolis, and several dry, dusty 
coal mines in the bituminous fields and interior coal fields that were remarkably free of 
methane[5]. Furthermore, research was being done in Europe through the end of the 19th 
century as to the explosibility of coal dusts. In 1893 George S. Rice, a pioneer in the 
investigations and prevention of mine explosions in the United States, published his 
conclusions recognizing the mechanism of dust explosions[2]. 
Though miners were becoming more aware of the dangers of coal dust 
involvement in methane ignitions propagating into explosions, the numbers of explosions 
and deaths continued to increase. This was due, in part, to a change in the pay structure of 
the miners. Previously paid based on the amount of lump or screened coal produced, they 
were now being paid (after 1897) based on the run-of-mine coal produced[5]. This 
removed the incentive for the miners to cut the coal and use smaller black powder 
charges when shooting; and incentivized shooting down the most coal in the easiest 
manner. This led to the use of larger quantities of black powder and many overcharged 
holes per shot. Overcharging the holes led to more blown out or failed holes, which in 
turn led to burning powder being ejected into the mine tunnel where the recent pressure 
pulse from the detonation had scoured coal dust into a fine cloud. These conditions were 
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ideal for igniting the coal dust and propagating an explosion further into the mine, and 
therefore the death toll continued to rise into the early 1900s. To counter this mining 
trend of shooting off the solid, and to curb the overcharging of black powder, many states 
passed laws limiting the maximum charge sizes allowed to be used and required that the 
shot firing be performed by qualified shot firers who inspected the holes prior to loading 
them[5]. In addition, since the coal dust explosion damage seemed worse in the intake 
airway, many mines slowed or stopped their fans during shot-firing to reduce the amount 
of fresh air and air pressure[5]. 
In June of 1907, the Secretary of the Interior transferred authority of the coal mine 
inspectors in the New Mexico and Indian Territory (including Oklahoma) to the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) with the intent of lessening the number of coal mine 
explosions. The results of the inquiry were published in December the same year as 
Bulletin 333[10]. That year also proved to be one of the worst on record with over 1,400 
miners killed by gas and dust explosions in coal mines. In response, Congress made an 
appropriation for the investigation of mine explosions, which became available July 1, 
1908. The USGS was tasked with the investigation, and a testing facility was quickly 
established near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The facility was opened for operation on 
December 3, 1908, and soon after began testing quick flaming explosives[5].  
The years 1908, 1909, and the beginning of 1910 continued to see a 
preponderance of coal mine explosions, and in May of 1910, the U.S. Bureau of Mines 
was created within the Department of the Interior. Initially, their role was limited to 
research and investigation, having no inspection or enforcement authority until much 
later[4]. Investigations into coal dust explosions began immediately. In 1911, the newly 
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formed Bureau of Mines had released Bulletin 20. This document is a comprehensive 
review of then-current research and disaster investigation reports, and the definition, 
origin, and distribution of coal dusts. Additionally, experiments were performed 
regarding the quality, density, coarseness, and chemical compositions of coal dusts using 
the test gallery developed by the USGS[5]. This early research showed favorable 
possibilities for the use of incombustible rock dust to prevent ignition of the coal dust, or 
at least limit the extent and violence of the incurred explosion. 
The general and continued reluctance of the coal mining industry to accept the 
explosion hazards of coal dust spurred the director of the Bureau of Mines to develop a 
real, full-scale mine to continue their coal dust explosion experiments in. This would 
ensure that the validity of the results of the testing could not be argued, and would be 
“…accepted as conclusive”[11]. In 1913, the Bureau of Mines released Bulletin 56 
reporting the results of the initial testing performed at the newly commissioned Bruceton 
Experimental Mine (BEM). Included in this round of testing were the effect of the French 
designed Taffanel Barrier, consisting of shelves of incombustible rock dust in the mine 
entry, on the ignition and severity of coal dust explosions. Researchers had commented 
on several of the tests that the flame of the explosion did not extend beyond the Taffanel 
Barriers[6]. These two early documents from the U.S. Bureau of Mines indicate the 
importance of rock dust in preventing or limiting the effects of coal dust explosions. 
Based on the information obtained from these early tests and the results of experiments 
performed around the world, the author and primary investigator of both reports, George 
Rice, began recommending the use of rock dust in coal mines[11]. 
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Investigations and research continued in the area of limiting or preventing coal 
dust explosions with the use of rock dust, and in 1924 the USBM released Bulletin 225 
titled Stone Dusting or Rock Dusting to Prevent Coal-Dust Explosions, as Practiced in 
Great Britain and France. The report reviews current research and practices in use 
throughout Europe. It reports that in 1920 Great Britain made stone dusting compulsory 
in coal mines that were dry and dusty, regulations which were later made more stringent. 
The author reports that the use of stone dusting is “…practically universal in British 
collieries”[12]. Though the efficiency of the method of application varies by mine, British 
regulations required that upon regular inspection of the roof, sides, and floor, the 
coal/rock dust mixture be maintained so that there not be more than 50% combustible 
materials[12]. 
Additionally, the Mines Department of France had approved the “schistification” 
(translated to shale dusting) of mines to prevent coal dust explosions[12]. Furthermore, the 
Taffanel Barriers were used as a secondary defense in many French mines. Similarly, the 
Germans were utilizing barrages of shelves supporting flue dust, rather than rock dust, 
and were also distributing the flue dust in the vicinity of shots being fired as well as along 
roadways. Along the roadways, the Germans were distributing flue dust by hand at a rate 
of 4.5 pounds of dust per lineal yard of roadway every 8 to 10 days[12]. This report is the 
first to mention an ideal ratio of coal to rock dust or the distribution of any prescribed 
amounts of incombustible matter. 
During the same time frame in the United States, despite being recommended by 
the Bureau of Mines, only a handful of mines (one in Colorado and several in Illinois) 
had adopted the use of rock dusting or rock dust barriers, and only to a limited extent. 
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Several of the operators in Illinois reported using the rock dust barriers and that their use 
had prevented numerous coal dust explosions started by methane ignitions or blown out 
shots, “…from propagating beyond the barrier in the mouth of the panel in which the 
explosion originated”[12]. Additionally, it also discusses the possibility of lung damage 
from using rocks containing high percentages of silica for the rock dust product. 
A new document released by the Bureau of Mines in 1927 reported on the 
modifications to the testing facility and the coal-dust explosion testing performed at the 
BEM between 1919 and 1924. The testing compared the standard that had been used for 
all previous testing, coal dust from the Pittsburgh seam, to coal dust from other mines, 
coal seams, coal-producing regions, and coal types. Within this report the Bureau of 
Mines published a table of the Limits of Explosibility of Coals Tested. In addition to 
listing the explosibility results of each coal tested, it “…presents valuable computations 
of the percentage of incombustible required to prevent ignition of or propagation of an 
explosion through various mixtures of coal dust and rock dust”[13]. This table indicated 
that no ignition could occur with any of the coals at a 64% incombustible content or 
above. 
Attached as an appendix to the Bureau of Mines report (1927) are recommended 
procedures for rock dusting American coal mines to prevent coal-dust explosions. This 
attachment discusses and outlines the particulars of using rock dust in coal mines. The 
attachment details which mines should be rock dusted (listing bituminous or lignite coal 
mines unless kept in a “muddy” condition). As well as, specifics on the qualities and type 
of dust used (>25% quartz or free silica), the size of dust used (100% by weight passing 
20 mesh and 50% passing 200 mesh), and the amounts of dust to be used (maintain 55% 
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incombustible content in all areas, increasing by 10% for each additional 1% of 
methane). Details for rock dust barriers were also given (>100 pounds of rock dust per 
square foot of entry cross section at barrier location). The parts of the mine to be dusted 
are also discussed (on the floor walls and roof of all main haulages, entries, and room and 
pillar workings to within 40 feet from the face or last cut-through). Finally, some 
comments on the sampling of the dust and maintaining of sampling records is covered[13]. 
This was the first document published in the United Sates that clearly spells out the risks 
of explosion and the benefits of rock dust in various types of coal mines across the 
country. However, due to the limited authority of the Bureau of Mines at the time, many 
still saw this information as suggestive or advisory. 
The Bureau of Mines quickly followed this three-page rock dusting best practice 
guide with a 149-page document titled Safety in Coal Mining [A Handbook] in 1928. As 
its name implies, it was meant to be a “…concise statement of practices and methods 
recommended by the bureau for the increase of safety in coal mining”[14]. It did not 
introduce any new research or information, but was an attempt to get the information out 
to all of the coal mining industry. This was done so all in the industry had the same 
information regarding the causes and methods of prevention of coal mine explosions and 
other lesser hazards. 
There were several topics discussed relating to the prevention of explosions. First 
was the use of ventilation to prevent gas buildup. This was followed by the explosibility 
risks of coal dust and rock dusting as a preventative measure. Two sets of standards were 
listed for rock dusting: the tentative specifications of the Bureau of Mines and the 
American Engineering Standards Committee’s code of recommended practices. It is 
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stated within that the code is the “same in principle” as that recommended by the Bureau 
of Mines, and that they “…cover different details but are in harmony with one 
another”[14]. It is of note that within the Bureau’s specifications, rock dust barriers are 
listed as an additional measure of safety to be installed “…at the mouths of all panels, 
cross-entries, and other key positions”, as suggested in the Bureau’s Technical Paper 
84[14]. Additionally, the bureau engineers recommend that the barriers “…not be regarded 
as sufficient by themselves or as the most important feature”[14]. Furthermore, they state 
that “general rock dusting is more important”, and restate that barriers are only to be 
considered as a second line of defense[14]. Similarly, the watering of coal dusts is 
condemned as a sole means of prevention. 
After the lengthy discussion on the explosibility of coal dusts and the standards 
for rock dusting, was a summary of facts regarding explosions and prevention. This 
section was very condensed and in plain language. Its purpose was to dispel some 
common myths long held in the coal industry regarding coal dust, methane, watering, etc. 
Next, the sources of ignition were discussed. Of primary concern were use of explosives, 
mine and miner lights (both safety lamps and the newer electric lamps), and electrical 
machinery[14]. The document was the first of its kind released in the United States by the 
government. The distribution of the information contained had far-reaching impact as is 
evidenced by the reduction in mine explosions and deaths the next year. In 1929, mine 
explosions only occurred 6 times and resulted in 146 deaths, an incredible reduction of 
the previous year (14 disasters/326 deaths in 1928)[3]. 
Attention returned to explosion prevention and the testing of rock dust barriers 
with the Bureau of Mines’ release of Bulletin 353 in 1932. By this time, rock dust 
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barriers were being used extensively in coal mines in the United States, France, and 
Germany for the arrest of coal dust explosions[15]. In the few years since their inception 
into practice, many derivations on the basic principle of the rock dust barrier had been 
devised by mining men and placed into practice in their respective test facilities or mines. 
Unfortunately, many of these barriers were not designed on proper principles of operation 
and with little regard for sufficient amounts of rock dust capacity. Additionally, many 
mines were using these barriers in place of general rock dusting instead of supplementary 
to it. In cases where explosions occurred, these barriers often worked to stop the flame of 
an explosion, but did not prevent the death of those miners that were in the path of the 
flame or encountered the toxic gases resulting from an explosion, known as afterdamp[15].  
In response, the Bureau of Mines performed systematic testing of about 350 
barrier designs that showed a reasonable chance of success and were not cost 
prohibitive[15]. The significance of this research is in the determination of favorable 
qualities for proper barrier operation in wide-ranging explosion pressures, the effects of 
various construction and installation techniques, and the minimum requirements for rock 
dust loading. The testing resulted in three barrier designs being approved for general use, 
with four additional barrier designs approved for special purposes. The minimum 
requirement for rock dust loading was also lowered from 100 to 60 pounds per square 
foot of cross section area at the barrier location. This previous higher amount was utilized 
before general rock dusting became practice, and the lower amount is contingent upon 
proper general rock dusting[15]. 
Many other barrier specifics were determined and outlined in this research as 
well. These include the importance of a sturdy and rigid construction for proper 
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operation. Additionally, barriers must extend across the entire width of the entry and be 
constructed close to the roof so flame does not pass over or around them. Furthermore, 
distance from the ignition source can affect proper operation if the barrier is too close for 
the explosion to develop adequate force to initiate the barrier before passing it. The ideal 
distance was not determined in this testing, but a preliminary distance of 200 to 300 feet 
was set[15]. In all, this research validated the efficacy of various barrier designs and 
detailed those qualities proven to be important for proper operation of any barrier. 
In 1933, the Bureau of Mines released Bulletin 369 Explosion Tests of Pittsburgh 
Coal Dust in the Experimental Mine 1925 to 1932, Inclusive. This research was mostly a 
compilation of previous testing that focused around the tabulation of the effects of small 
changes to various factors of the coal and rock dusts used, the location and sources of 
ignition, and the varying distribution of coal dusts. Additional testing included the 
minimum gas explosion required to ignite coal dust and the effect that stratified gas 
mixtures had on ignition[16]. In general, this assisted in the understanding of the finer 
points of the ignition and propagation of coal dust explosions and the effects of various 
qualities of rock dusts in extinguishing a developing explosion. Research continued in 
this area of finer understanding, but with the declining occurrence of mine explosions and 
little new developments, safety regulations remained advisory[11].  
 This prior research and several larger headline-grabbing mine explosions led to 
many legislative changes over the following decades. After only 1 coal mine disaster in 
1939 claiming 28 lives, 1940 brought 6 explosion disasters claiming 276 lives[3]. This 
promulgated Congress to pass Public Law 77-49 granting federal mining investigators the 
right of entry into private coal mines for the purpose of making inspections and 
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recommending improvements[4]. Another large coal mine explosion disaster early in 1947 
at the No. 5 mine in Centralia, Illinois, claimed the lives of 111 miners and instigated 
Congress to pass Public Law 80-328 creating the first Federal standards for safety in 
lignite and bituminous coal mines. This law also enhanced the rights of federal inspectors 
to notify mine operators and their respective state mining agencies of any violations, yet 
still no enforcement powers were afforded to any agency, state or federal, to ensure 
adherence to the new standards[4]. In 1951, the explosion at the Orient No. 2 mine in 
Illinois claimed the lives of 119 miners and prompted the implementation of the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act the following year. This new law called for the 
discontinued use of black powder as an explosive, which was possible due to the 
discovery that the addition of sodium chloride to explosives reduced their flame 
production and thereby advanced permissible explosives. Additionally, the new law 
established rock dusting standards for all mines, requiring a minimum incombustible 
content of 65%[17]. This value is presumably derived from the Bureau of Mines’ previous 
publication, Bulletin 268[13]. 
Seeing that the new laws had little impact on the continued occurrence of coal 
mine explosions through the remainder of the 1950s and into the 1960s, Congress 
expanded the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1952 to include all 
underground coal mines, not just those employing more than 15 people in 1966. The 
expansion also gave inspectors the right to issue withdrawal orders to mines that were 
repeat offenders refusing to comply with the new standards. Education and training 
programs for investigators and miners alike were also expanded[4]. In 1968 the Consol 
No. 9 explosion in Farmington, West Virginia killed 78 miners. With renewed interest in 
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mine safety, the subsequent year brought the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 
commonly known as the Coal Act. The most significant aspect of this new law was the 
ability for the federal agency to enforce safety standards with mandatory monetary fines 
and possible civil or criminal litigation. In 1973 the Mining Enforcement and Safety 
Administration (MESA) was created to relieve the Bureau of Mines from conflicting 
duties[4].  
Another important event in 1973 was the release of the book Coal Dust 
Explosions and Their Suppression by a Polish researcher, Waclaw Cybulski. This nearly 
600-page book is the first and only university-level collection and discussion of the 
worldwide research efforts and knowledge, to date, related to coal dust explosions, and 
their prevention and suppression. In addition to the collective knowledge base, Cybulski 
added results of research and experiments completed at the Polish Experimental Mine 
Barbara and compared them to those of the other researchers. Of significance to this 
report, are the findings by Cybulski of the explosibility of coal dusts based on the 
percentage of incombustible content needed to prevent the ignition of coal dusts versus 
that required to prevent the propagation of an explosion. Cybulski concluded from his 
research that under the most ideal conditions, incombustible contents of up to 82.5% 
were required to prevent the propagation of an explosion due to the strong turbulent 
movement of particles within the dust clouds[18]. This was much higher than the 60 to 
65% incombustible content currently required to prevent the ignition of various coal 
dusts. Additionally, Cybulski found that coal dust explosions can be initiated with less 
energy in smaller workings, like roadways, yet an explosion that has already developed 
propagates more easily in a larger working.  
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Among his many conclusions, Cybulski states that it is not possible to fight the 
coal dust explosion hazards found in most coal mines by just one method, and that in the 
fight against them “…not a single line of defense can be neglected”[18]. Furthermore, he 
states that in spite of the complex nature and various causes of coal dust explosions, the 
task of overcoming them is practical and attainable if all lines of defense are utilized[18]. 
Cybulski listed nine practices of paramount importance in the prevention and control of a 
coal dust explosion. The following is a brief explanation of his points: 
1) Limiting the formation of coal dusts: this applies to the means by which coal is 
extracted, and to the fineness of coal dust produced during the mining operations. 
2) The removal of coal dusts: this refers to good housekeeping practices of 
preventing and removing spills and other accumulations, and the use of dust 
collection equipment where appropriate. 
3) Preventing the dispersibility of coal dusts: this is typically done by wetting of the 
dust to keep it from floating on the air currents in the mine. This is generally done 
at the point of formation, such as the cutter head of a continuous miner, or at 
points where the dust can be raised into the air, such as at dumps, transfer and 
discharge points, and along haulageways due to the passing of equipment. 
4) Preventing the ignition of the primary dust cloud: this refers to reducing the 
ignitability of the coal dust (by increasing incombustible content or wetting), and 
the control of ignition methods (open flame, electrical arcing, explosives use, 
friction, and methane ignitions) 




6) Limiting the range of coal dust explosions by stunting the progress of the already 
developed explosions: this relates to the necessary use of explosion barriers. 
7) Checking up on the hazards of coal dust explosions: this means to periodically re-
inspect and re-evaluate the hazard. 
8) Issuing regulations on suppressing the hazard of coal dust explosions: this calls on 
the governments of coal mining nations to enact safety regulations based on 
scientific research. 
9) Carrying out scientific research work on the improvement of methods of 
suppressing coal dust explosions: this calls for the continuation of future research 
into this area. 
In support of his reasoning for these nine lines of defense, Cybulski admits that 
any one of them “…might, unfortunately, fail now and again…” within the dynamic 
working environment of a coal mine allowing the initiation of a coal dust explosion[18]. 
His viewpoint on the inevitability of future explosions is due to his belief that the rock 
dusting standards of many other countries “…are in many cases inadequate”[18]. The 
extent of damages related to any explosion is in direct relation to the intensity of the 
explosion, which in turn depends on various parameters, not the least of which is the 
distance an explosion is allowed to continue. Cybulski states, “…therefore it is most 
desirable to ensure that its course be made as short as possible”[18].  
Cybulski further highlights the importance of stone dust barriers at arresting coal 
dust explosions by stating that they are “…to be used as the last defense line”, and that 
they are “…of the highest possible dependability for checking the range of an 
explosion”[18]. Over 1,700 tests were performed at the Polish Experimental Mine Barbara 
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on explosion barriers of various types and construction, and of those utilizing stone dust 
and water. Testing there determined both extinguishing media to be satisfactory at 
stopping medium to strong explosions, while the stone dust barriers had a slight 
advantage at stopping weaker, slower traveling, explosions. Testing also determined the 
ideal barrier placement for the three degrees of explosion intensities were all at 100 
meters; while Cybulski states that “barriers placed at distances from 60 to 200 meters 
from the gallery’s face stopped explosions assuredly, in all cases”[18]. 
While this research was not performed in the United States, it had a large impact 
on the scientific community in the United States after its translation to English and 
subsequent publishing of the complete work for the Bureau of Mines was completed in 
1975[18]. The following year, the Bureau of Mines released the Report of Investigations 
8170 titled “Water Barriers for the Suppressing of Coal Dust Explosions”. After testing 
three different designs of water barriers in a single entry at the Bruceton Experimental 
Mine, researchers proposed plans for the implementation of water barriers in a working 
mine on a trial basis[19]. In 1977, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act was passed. 
This act consolidated all of the Federal health and safety regulations related to mining of 
any kind under one law and authority, the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MSHA). This act also required rock dusting of return air to be increased to 80% 
incombustible content as opposed to all other applicable locations requiring 65% [20]. 
The year 1981 saw the final testing of coal dust explosion related research at 
BEM, with the release of Report of Investigations 8538, titled “Suppression of Coal Dust 
Explosion by Water Barrier in a Conveyor Belt Entry”. This was a continuation of the 
1976 work by the Bureau of Mines, and was a realization of the recommendations made 
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therein to test the water barriers in a belt entry[21]. With the funding set out in the 1977 
Mine Safety Act, the Bureau of Mines acquired a 400-acre facility to continue research in 
a larger, multiple-entry mine setting, and in 1982 the Lake Lynn Experimental Mine was 
opened. Much of the focus of research there was related to self-rescuers, oil shale mine 
explosion risks, explosives, and mine seals and stoppings[11]. 
In 1995, Congress recommended the closure of the USBM to the chagrin of many 
in the industry. The mining research laboratory facilities and staff were temporarily 
transferred to the Department of Energy, but after a few months landed under the 
supervision of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), under 
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). To date the Mine Health and Safety program has 
maintained a separate identity within that of NIOSH[22].  
2.5. CURRENT COAL DUST EXPLOSION PREVENTION STRATEGIES 
WORLDWIDE 
In coal mining countries around the world, there are four primary strategies 
employed to manage the risk of coal dust explosions and their widespread damage. There 
are multiple control strategies because no single prevention or control measure is 
sufficient by itself and can easily break down or fail in mining conditions. Similarly, 
different mines, and different locations within the same mine, can require different 
control approaches. The need for each strategy rests on their individual merits, but the 
individual strategies work together to form a mesh of protective measures that is only as 
strong as the weakest layer. 
The first, and most effective, coal dust explosion prevention strategy is the 
removal of any coal dust accumulations. This prevents coal dust accumulations at transfer 
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points and along coal transportation routes. The cleanup of any spill or accumulations of 
coal dusts within the mine should be performed. However, this is not always possible, or 
safely practical, such as in the return airways. 
The second coal dust explosion prevention strategy is the wetting of the coal dust 
to prevent it from becoming airborne, stoichiometrically mixed, and capable of being 
ignited. This is typically done where the coal dust is produced, near the cutter or shearing 
heads of the mining equipment. Modern coal mining equipment can be outfitted with 
water sprayers and/or dust filtration systems. However, this is not always possible or 
practical throughout a working mine. 
The third coal dust explosion prevention strategy is to mix the coal dust with an 
inert material. Typically, limestone dust is used, giving rise to the action known as rock 
dusting or stone dusting. This effectually increases the total incombustible content (TIC) 
of the dusts that collect in the mine workings. These dusts could become airborne and 
ignited in the event of an explosion if the TIC of the dusts is not high enough. However, 
since coal dusts are continually produced during mining operations, rock dusting requires 
continual renewal. 
The fourth coal dust explosion prevention strategy is the installation of an 
explosion-activated barrier that is comprised of a sufficient quantity of inert material, 
which when released makes an entire section of the mine entry inert and incombustible. 
This acts to interrupt the progress of the flame front of a developing explosion, so it 
cannot continue propagating into the next section. The two main sources of coal dust 
ignition and its subsequent explosion are small methane gas ignitions and improper use of 
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explosives. These sources of coal dust ignition are controlled via separate means and 
regulations but also play an integral role in preventing coal dust explosions. 
2.5.1. U.S. Mines and Their Current Practices.  As per the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) Title 30; Part 75; Subpart E-Combustible Materials and Rock Dusting; Section 
75.400 through 75.404, and in summary: 
• Coal dust, coal float dust, loose coal, and other combustible materials shall be 
cleaned up and not permitted to accumulate in active workings or on equipment 
therein 
• A program for regular cleanup and removal of these items shall be established and 
maintained 
• Where mining operations create or raise excessive dust, water (with or without 
wetting agent) shall be used to abate such dust, with distances less than 40 feet 
from the working face, water (with or without wetting agent) shall be applied to 
ribs, roof, and floor to reduce dust dispersibility and minimize explosion hazard 
• All underground areas of mine, except those areas where the dust is too wet or has 
an extremely high incombustible content, shall be rock dusted to within 40 feet of 
all working faces, including crosscuts, unless deemed unsafe to enter 
• Where rock dust is required, it shall be distributed on the top, floor, and sides of 
all underground areas and maintained in such quantities that the total 
incombustible content of the coal dust, rock dust, and any other dust or moisture 
shall be not less than 80%. 
• Where methane is present the percent of incombustible content of the combined 
dusts shall be increased 0.4% for each 0.1% of methane 
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The MSHA standards address three of the four coal dust explosion prevention strategies, 
coal dust removal, coal dust wetting, and mixing of coal dust with inert material, or rock 
dusting. However, the MSHA standards do not address the fourth coal dust explosion 
prevention strategy of explosion activated barriers[24]. 
2.5.2. Foreign Mines and Their Current Practices. While there are many 
countries that mine coal and that have implemented coal dust explosion barriers into their 
regulatory regimes, finding English translations of those regulations was difficult. 
Therefore, attention was focused on those regulations that could be readily obtained in 
English, such as; Canada, New South Wales (NSW), New Zealand (NZ), the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA), and the United Kingdom (UK). While there were minor differences 
in the required percentages of incombustible content for these countries (between 65% 
and 85% in certain areas[25]), they all detailed similar strategies for the prevention and 
removal of coal dust buildups, wetting of coal dusts in areas with high ignition 
probability or high dust production to reduce explosion hazards, rock dusting to within 12 
meters (40 feet) of the working face on all surfaces, and increased rock dusting 
requirements for the presence of excess methane (from 0.4% per 0.1% methane to 1% per 
each 0.1% methane)[26- 33]. However, unlike the U.S. CFR, all of these foreign regulatory 
regimes require the implementation and maintenance of explosion activated barriers as 
part of their explosion prevention and suppression tactics. 
In Alberta Canada, regulations require the design, erection, location, and 
maintenance of explosion barriers is certified by a professional engineer. Additionally, 
they must be placed at all entrances for every production section, all entrances to every 
development district (as soon as the development district has advanced 200 meters), and 
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at all entrances to every ventilation split (intake and return)[25]. In British Columbia 
Canada, any underground coal mine that is dry and dusty must have explosion barriers 
certified by the chief inspector. The barriers are to be installed at locations designated by 
the manager and authorized by the district inspector. Regular inspections (every 4 weeks 
or less) and inspector qualifications are also stipulated[25]. In New Zealand, mine 
employers must take practical steps to ensure that explosion barriers are erected at 
suitable locations that will limit or contain the ignition of coal dusts or gases[31].  
In NSW, mine managers are required to have means in place to prevent an 
explosion and to suppress any such explosion should it occur, including but not limited to 
prevention of coal dust accumulations, required amounts of stone dust applied, and the 
installation and maintenance of explosion barriers[33]. A separately published technical 
document spells out the required locations and other barrier requirements[32]. 
Additionally, companies such as Skillpro Services in NSW, who were invaluable sources 
of information for this project, have published guidelines for the implementation of their 
bag barrier systems in mines[34]. 
In the UK, mine operators must ensure that suitable and effective explosion 
barriers are in place to prevent the development and propagation of a coal dust 
explosion[29]. Again, separate technical documents dictate the location and other 
requirements of the barriers[28]. Finally, in the RSA, mine employers must ensure that 
effective measures are taken to prevent or suppress coal dust explosions[27]. There is also 
an entire document devoted to guidelines and codes of practice for the prevention of coal 
dust explosions, including prescriptions for explosion barriers and their installations[26]. 
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In review of the separate explosion prevention documents for the RSA, UK, and 
NSW, it was noted that all three outline descriptive and installation requirements of a 
bagged type of stone dust explosion barrier. Many other similarities were also noticed. 
The similarities and differences in barrier specifications are best summed in the Table 
portrayed in Figure 2.2. 
2.6. STONE DUST BARRIER HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING 
Stone dust explosion barriers were initially introduced in the 1920s and consisted 
of elevated shelves that supported mounds of stone dust on them. The basic design 
principle was that the pressure wave that moves ahead of an explosion flame front would 
upset, or overturn, the shelves causing the supported stone dust to become airborne and 
extinguish the flame front upon its arrival due to the high levels of incombustible content. 
Their design did not change much over the next decades, except for slight variations in 
the construction of the shelves, the materials used for shelf construction, and the amount 
of stone dust supported on them. A variant of this basic design was also developed using 
troughs of water instead of stone dust[33]. Regardless, explosion barrier use was still 
limited even after the most recent research completed at the time, performed by Cybulski 
in 1973, clearly showed that stone-dusting alone was not sufficient to prevent or suppress 
coal dust explosions, and that additional lines of defense, such as explosion barriers, were 
needed[18]. This echoed the same advice of George Rice’s experiments in the early 1900s. 
In the early 1990s the Division of Mining Technology within the Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of South Africa began development and testing 
of a new system for the effective implementation and low cost installation of stone dust 




Figure 2.2: Comparison of Bagged Stone Dust Barrier Specifications for the United          
Kingdom, Republic of South Africa, and New South Wales[35]  
40 
 
and the need for a system that was effective, yet cheaper and easier to install and 
maintain. This new system was based on individual bags, containing stone dust, hung in 
an equal distance and spacing arrangement from the mine roof, known as the bag barrier. 
The bags would react to an explosion, much the same as the previous shelf designs, and 
disperse the contained stone dust (Figures 2.3 and 2.4). The bags themselves are designed 
with special anisotropic characteristics that support the weight of 6kg (approximately 13 
pounds) of stone dust for an indefinite period of time without deteriorating or degrading, 
and still rupture at very low pressures (reported as low as 4.0 kPa or approximately 0.58 
psi) allowing dispersal of the enclosed stone dust[36]. Furthermore, the bag and 
complimentary hook and ring closure system effectively encloses the stone dust, aiding in 
the prevention of moisture contamination and caking of the stone dust (Figure 2.5.). 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Bag Testing in Shock Tunnel at Kloppersbos Testing Facility 
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The bag and hook design underwent extensive testing and development over the 
next several years. The testing continued at the Kloppersbos Research Facility in South 
Africa (a circular tunnel with 5m2 cross sectional area) and the Tremonia Experimental 
Mine Gallery in Germany (20 and 22 m2 cross sectional areas). This testing proved the 
concept of the bag stone dust barriers, and the effectiveness of these barriers at protecting 
long single-entry mines during coal dust explosions of varying magnitudes. However, 
most underground coal mines use multiple entry methods of mine development. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Bag Explosion Testing at Kloppersbos Testing Facility 
 
Due to the common use of multiple entry mining layouts, further testing was 
performed at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
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Pittsburgh Research Laboratory’s Lake Lynn Experimental Mine in Pennsylvania in the 
late 1990s[36]. This facility was the only one worldwide that could accommodate such 
explosion barrier testing in a multiple entry development. The test facility was comprised 
of three entries with seven crosscuts located towards the inby end of the entries. This 
layout is similar to three entry headings currently used in many U.S. longwall coal mines. 
After several preliminary test explosions were performed to calibrate the equipment and 
explosion pressures, the bag stone dust barriers were tested in various barrier 
configurations and under various explosion pressures. 
 
 




In these tests, the bagged stone dust barriers were proven to be 100% successful, 
in the distributed barrier and concentrated barrier configurations, at stopping the flame 
propagation of a coal dust explosion within the barrier zones under different coal and 
stone dust loading amounts (69 and 82 percent TIC)[36]. This testing therefore proved the 
viability of using the bagged stone dust barriers in medium, multiple entry mines under 
different dust loading and barrier configurations. However, the bag barrier system’s 
operation is still dependent on the pressures developed by the explosion and the barriers’ 
location in respect to the ignition point (bags located in crosscuts are less likely to rupture 
and disperse stone dust effectively due to pressure equalization between entries)[36]. 
Based on these findings, the RSA and NSW began outlining the use of bagged stone dust 
barriers in their regulations in 2002, with the UK following suit in 2004[37-39]. 
Furthermore, many countries’ principle barrier design features are based on the distance, 
spacing, and dust loading outlined in these conclusive tests. 
A bagged stone dust barrier was reported to have been activated during an 
explosion in an underground Polish coal mine in 2002. The explosion was caused by the 
incorrect use and disposal of explosives. It was reported that ten miners inby the barrier 
were killed. However, two miners located just outby the barrier were burned but 
survived, and thirty-five miners in an adjacent longwall panel were unharmed[40]. So, 
thirty-seven lives were saved in this instance by the use of the bag stone dust explosion 
barrier system. 
2.7. HIGH EXPLOSIVES TESTING 
When a spherical high explosive charge detonates, energy is released from the 
chemical bonds and the resultant hot gases quickly expand outward, spherically, from the 
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charge.  This sudden expansion of hot gases lasts only a few microseconds. The amount 
of gas produced is relative to the chemical composition of the explosive itself, and the 
pressure imposed by the expanding gasses is dependent on the position, or distance from 
the detonation, that the pressure observation is made. In cases where the detonation 
occurs in a large open space, commonly referred to as a free-field blast, the hot gas 
production results in the rapid expansion of the surrounding air, further propagating with 
wave-like behavior. This means that the shock wave created from the detonation transfers 
energy through matter and space without a transfer of mass. This shock wave produces a 
nearly instantaneous rise in pressure surrounding the charge that propagates through the 
air with a velocity greater than the speed of sound. The highest pressure attained is 
denoted as the peak pressure; and the time elapsed from the arrival of the pressure wave 
to the peak pressure point is called the pressure rise time. After the shock wave reaches 
its maximum pressure, the pressure begins decreasing exponentially until it equals the 
ambient air pressure; this period is designated as the positive phase duration. Following 
this, the pressure surrounding the detonation becomes lower than ambient air pressure for 
a brief period, called the negative phase. The negative phase of the shock wave has a 
longer duration waveform than that of the positive phase; which exhibits high intensity 
and short duration. This comparison can readily be seen in Figure 2.6. Furthermore, the 
area under the time pressure curve in Figure 2.6 represents the impulse of the detonation 
event. The short duration of the peak pressure spike compared to the overall duration of 
the positive phase indicates that the time required to rupture a barrier bag and disperse the 
contained stone dust is likely related more closely to the impulse than the peak pressure. 
Additionally, as the distance between the charge detonation and the point of pressure 
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measurement is increased, the positive phase duration increases and the peak pressure 
decreases[42]. Figure 2.7 illustrates the effect that distance has on the lowering of peak 
pressures and the lengthening of the positive phase. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Pressure vs Time Graph[43] 
 
Regarding explosion pressures, there are differences in the way explosion 
pressure is applied to objects, and therefore also differences in how pressure is measured. 
Hydrostatic, or incident, pressure is measured by a sensor mounted flush to a surface that 
is parallel to the flow of the blast wave. This pressure indicates the force (per unit area) 
on a surface caused by the motion of the air/gas molecules around it, but does not include 




Figure 2.7: Pressure-Distance Relationship[42]  
 
behind the shock being “…brought to rest non-isentropically” against a surface that is 
face-on with the blast, and adds the translational kinetic energy component to the 
hydrostatic pressure measurement[44]. Reflected pressure is the biggest load force 
produced by an explosive wave. Total pressure, or stagnation pressure, is the pressure 
that remains after the primary shock reflects back into the oncoming blast wave, and is 
measured by a sensor mounted flush to a surface which faces the flow of the blast wave. 
This results in a value that represents the pressure exerted on a surface by the work done 
to “…bring the gas to a rest and to compress it adiabatically”[44]. Dynamic pressure is not 
a physical property of the flow from a blast wave and cannot be directly measured. It can 
however be calculated from the simultaneous independent measurement of hydrostatic 
and total pressures[44]. 
The measurement of total and hydrostatic pressures can be performed with 
sensors that utilize piezo-electric crystal technology to produce a high response rate 
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electrical signal. This signal is very low current and requires a signal amplifier in-line or 
built into the data storage device. The range of electrical voltage supplied by the sensor is 
calibrated to a pressure curve supplied by the sensor manufacturer. Hydrostatic pressure 
sensors are typically mounted in the side of a sharp pointed cylinder, called a pencil 
probe (Figure 2.8). The point is directed at the center of the charge to minimize edge 
effects from the shock striking the transducer at an angle[44]. Total pressure sensors, 
sometimes called surface mount sensors, are similar except the piezo crystal faces the 
blast wave and is recessed in the end of a threaded body (Figure 2.9). 
 
 
Figure 2.8: PCB Piezotronics Pencil Probe Pressure Transducer[45] 
 
  
Figure 2.9: PCB Piezotronics Surface Mount Pressure Transducer[46] 
 
The characteristics of a given blast wave are of interest in various explosives 
research areas such as structural design, weapons design, and injury prevention and 
48 
 
characterization, just to name a few. The pressure rise time is one parameter to consider 
in blast wave pressure analysis. In a theoretical shock wave the rise time is considered to 
be zero. However, in reality there is a finite, yet extremely small, amount of time that 
passes during the pressure rise. The positive phase duration can be calculated by 
subtracting the wave arrival time from the positive phase end time, shown in Formula 1. 
The positive phase duration is important in understanding the magnitude of force applied 
on an object or structure because it directly affects the impulse of the shock wave. The 
impulse is a quantitative measurement of the magnitude of pressure applied over a 
specific amount of time, and greatly influences the degree of damage to an object or 
structure, or the extent of injury to a human being exposed to an explosion shockwave[42]. 
By definition, impulse is the area underneath a pressure-time graph; or in other words, the 
integral of pressure as a function of time from the wave arrival time (ta), to the time that 
the positive phase ends (ta+tpp). This definition is shown in Formula 2. Since a pressure 
curve cannot easily be represented with a mathematical function, impulse is often 
calculated via a finite sum method, or slicing method, as shown in Formula 3. In this 
method, the average of two pressures in successive time slices is multiplied by the 
difference in their corresponding times, and then the products of all the slices are 
summed.  
Formula 1: Positive Phase Duration = Positive Phase End Time - Wave Arrival Time 









𝑖 𝑃𝑖−1) × (𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖−1) 
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Often, pressure and impulse are analyzed together in order to determine the 
amount of damage caused by explosives and their subsequent shock waves. By plotting 
the peak pressure and maximum impulse of a blast on an object-specific pressure-impulse 
diagram, such as the one pictured in Figure 2.10, the threshold of damage caused by the 
pressure and impulse components of explosions can be established. The perpendicular 
lines with a radiused corner depicted in Figure 2.10 represent the damage threshold for 
the object being tested, or the curve of constant damage. In the case of testing for this 
thesis, it will represent the bags, and it is the one variable that remains the same 
throughout the testing. To the left, or below, the curve of constant damage is a region of 
little to no damage, or inconsistent damage to the items tested. Above or to the right of 
the curve is a region of consistent and severe damage to the items being tested. 
Another pressure-impulse diagram is depicted in Figure 2.11. However, this 
diagram shows more detail regarding the specific damage regions, and that region’s 
sensitivity to impulse, pressure, or a combination of the two known as the dynamically 
sensitive region, which is typically the most difficult region to define. Note that the 
pressure and impulse axis are swapped between the two diagrams. If the sensitivity 
regions in Figure 2.11 are examined, it is noticed that as pressure decreases, the pressure 
sensitive region is entered. It is called this because very little differences in pressure 
require large changes in impulse to maintain the curve of constant damage. Conversely, 
as pressure increases, the impulse sensitive region is entered because very little 
differences in impulse require large changes in pressure to maintain the curve of constant 
damage. These asymptotic regions define the limits of the pressure and impulse effects on 




Figure 2.10: Pressure-Impulse Diagram[42] 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Pressure-Impulse Damage Curve with Sensitivities Labeled[51] 
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Deviations from an ideal pressure-time graph will add complexities to pressure 
data analysis. In most testing situations, the explosive charge is in proximity to objects 
and obstacles, such as walls or the ground, causing the shock wave produced during the 
explosion to be reflected off these surfaces. As the incident shock wave and reflections 
interact, they can act constructively and cause an increase in pressure and impulse[43]. 
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2.12. Additionally, this causes the positive 
phase duration to increase due to the creation of multiple peaks in the pressure curve. 
This also leads to an increase in the explosion impulse. This can have a significant impact 
on the shock wave’s effect on nearby objects and the resulting damages. A more realistic 
pressure-time graph with multiple reflections is typical of what would be expected to be 
witnessed during the explosive testing of the barrier bags, and is portrayed in Figure 2.13. 
The multiple reflections act to increase the explosion impulse without significant impact 
to the maximum pressure, similar to that observed in explosion shock tunnel testing and 
mine tunnel explosions. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Interaction of Reflected and Incident Shock Waves[43] 
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The understanding of these explosives testing principles and parameters was 
imperative for the testing to later be performed on the barrier bags, and the resulting data 
analysis and conclusions. The distance effects on pressure and impulse, along with the 
pressure and impulse increasing effects of shockwave interactions are crucial to 
designing bag testing experiments so that the desired ranges of pressure and impulse are 
obtained in each of the experimental setups.  
 
 
Figure 2.13: Realistic Pressure - Time Graph 
 
2.8. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, coal mining has been a part of American culture for over 300 years, 
even before its independence from Great Britain. Coal mine explosions have been 
occurring since the mines got deep enough that adequate ventilation to prevent methane 
buildup became a problem. There have been many methods used over the years to 
prevent coal mine explosions, early ones centered on eliminating methane accumulations 
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by igniting them regularly. Later, scientific research lead to other methods of better 
ventilation, and the importance of ventilation on methane removal became clear. Further 
research led to the insight of the involvement of coal dust in coal mine explosions, along 
with the need for increasing the incombustible content of mine dusts. This insight led to 
the practice of widespread rock dusting. The occurrence of coal dust explosions was 
reduced drastically, but continued to occur. Continued research showed that rock dusting 
alone is not a guarantee against coal dust explosions and additional testing centered on 
explosion barriers. Many versions of barriers were developed and tested over the decades 
by researchers from numerous countries. 
In response to continued coal dust explosions and increasing costs of prevention, 
researchers in South Africa developed a new type of explosion barrier, the bagged stone 
dust type of explosion barrier. Development of this system continued with testing 
performed at different research facilities around the world, including the Lake Lynn Test 
Facility in the United States. All testing in the various galleries proved this barrier type to 
be effective at extinguishing a propagating explosion. Based on the results of the testing, 
the RSA and NSW began to implement them into their mines. Regulatory agencies in, 
NZ and the UK soon followed. The United States has increased the TIC requirement of 
mine dusts, but has yet to institute the use of explosion barriers, though a century of 
research by a multitude of domestic and foreign researchers have shown that the practice 
of rock dusting is insufficient in and of itself to prevent the propagation of a coal dust 
explosion; and that additional methods of prevention are historically recommended, such 
as explosion barriers.  
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The explosive testing to be performed as part of this thesis is based on widely 
accepted understanding of explosion shock physics. Standard equipment and principles 
will be utilized to complete the testing. Common formulas will also be used to calculate 
values needed for the analysis and assessment of the peak pressure and impulse effects of 
explosion shock waves on the barrier bags. The difference between peak pressure and 
maximum impulse is significant to the understanding of the operational characteristics of 



















3. OPERATION OF BAG TYPE PASSIVE EXPLOSION BARRIERS 
3.1. BAG BARRIER TESTING OVERVIEW 
The purpose of investigating the operation of bag type passive explosion barriers 
(Objective 1) was to understand the principle operational characteristics of the system. 
This was needed so that nothing in the fundamental operation of the bag barriers would 
be overlooked in their application and implementation into the diverse and dynamic 
environments found in U.S. coal mines. A review of previous bag barrier system testing 
unveiled a discrepancy in previous testing and the possible misrepresentation of the 
dynamic operation of a barrier bag. Previous research reports the minimum pressure 
required to “operate” a bag barrier system is as low as 4.0 kPa (0.58psi)[36]. However, this 
research makes no distinction between the pressure required to rupture the bag, and the 
sudden rush of a large mass of air past the ruptured bag that is believed to disperse the 
contained rock dust. Both are required to extinguish a developing coal dust explosion; 
however, these two operational aspects are of different genesis. 
A majority of underground coal mines are constructed of rectangular cross-
sectional tunnels (similar to explosive shock tunnels). When an explosion occurs, the 
mine tunnel confines the gaseous bi-products and focuses the gases along the course of 
the tunnel away from the source of ignition. To demonstrate the importance of the 
explosion pressure funneling effect of the mine tunnels on the rupture of the barrier bags 
and the subsequent dispersing of the contained rock dust, the bags were tested in two 
different ways.  
First, the bags were tested in an open air, or arena, testing environment to 
determine the minimum explosion shock pressure required to rupture or tear the stone 
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dust filled bags without any influence from the pressure funneling effect of a mine tunnel. 
Second, the stone dust filled bags were tested in a fabricated steel shock tunnel to 
demonstrate the same range of explosion shock pressures found to rupture or tear the 
barrier bags in the arena tests, but with the added effects of increased impulse from the 
simulated mine tunnel. These tests should clearly demonstrate that the minimum 
explosion shock pressure required to rupture the barrier bags is significantly higher than 
referenced, and is separate from the impulse required to disperse the newly released stone 
dust along a mine tunnel. 
3.2. OPEN AIR TESTS 
This experiment consisted of 3 test shots, outfitted with 6 pressure sensors each, 
performed in an open arena. Each test was performed with incrementally larger C4 
explosive charge sizes. The sizes of C4 charges for the three tests were 60 grams, 120 
grams, and 240 grams. The recording of the resultant pressures, impulse, and the effects 
of the shock pressures on the Skillpro Stone Dust Barrier Bags was performed. The 
materials and equipment utilized during these tests are listed in Appendix A. 
3.2.1. Open Air Testing Method. The goal was to record the pressure versus time data, to 
analyze the recorded data, and to determine the Time of Wave Arrival, Peak Pressure, 
and Positive Phase End Time. These values were then used to calculate the Positive 
Phase Duration and Impulse. The resulting damage, or lack of damage, to the barrier bags 
was also recorded. This allowed the assessment of the bags in relation to pressure and 
impulse, and set the target pressures for the tunnel testing. 
Six test stands were fabricated to support the barrier bags by their mounting hooks 
and included pressure probe mounts that fixed the probes at the approximate center of 
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mass of a 6 kg stone dust filled barrier bag so the pressure readings obtained accurately 
represented the pressure experienced by the bag. One Skillpro Stone-Dust Bag was hung 
from each test stand, approximately midway on the horizontal hanger bar as shown in 
Figure 3.1. The placement of test stands within the setup area was considered so that a 
view of all test stands was not obstructed from the camera located in the video viewing 
panel within the safety bunker. The charge hanging stand, with charge hanging wire, was 
placed in a central location. Measuring from the charge hanging wire, the first test stand 
was placed at a distance of 5 feet (Test Stand 1 in Figure 3.2). Each additional stand was 
placed at a 2-feet greater distance than the previous one, being sure not to position them 
directly behind the previous stand when viewed from the explosive charge position. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: View of Typical Test Stand, Pressure Sensor, and Barrier Bag Setup 
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When complete, six test stands, arranged in an arc around the centrally located 
charge hanging wire, were used at distances of 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 feet. The pencil 
probe pressure transducers, measuring incident pressure, were inserted into the holders 
until the sensor crystal assembly was in line with the vertical bar of the stand, or centrally 
located with the bag. They were also verified to be angled directly at the center of the 
explosive charge and at the correct distance, and then secured. The probes were 
numbered 1 through 6 to resemble the corresponding barrier bag on the same stand. 
Probe 6 was in the final stand located at 15 feet, as shown in Figure 3.2. Pre-made 
weights were hung on each test stand for stability during testing. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: View of Test Site Setup Illustrating the Test Stand 
           Order and Position about a Simulated Charge 
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A standard blasting cap was prepared with a trigger wire pigtail taped over the 
end so the pigtail wire would be broken upon detonation of the blasting cap. The wire 
breaking opens the trigger circuit signaling the time of detonation (T0) to the DAS. This 
data parameter was used for signaling the beginning of data recording. The desired size 
charge for the test being performed was hung from the charge hanging wire at the same 
elevation as the middle of the Skillpro Stone-Dust Bags, 4 feet from the ground. The 
blasting cap, with the trigger wire pigtail, was inserted horizontally into the rear of the 
hanging charge (the side facing away from the test stands and barrier bags), with the 
wires routed away from the charge as depicted in Figure 3.3.  
 
 




3.2.2.  Open Air Testing Results. The results of the testing followed the 
anticipated trends. As expected, with an increase in charge weight, a resulting increase in 
peak pressure and impulse was observed at each distance. At 5 feet, the 240g C4 charge 
produced a peak pressure of 18.55 psi and an impulse of 7.09 psi*ms, whereas the 120g 
C4 charge resulted in a peak pressure of 11.66 psi and an impulse of 4.89 psi*ms, and the 
60 g C4 charge resulted in a peak pressure of 8.73 psi and an impulse of 3.30 psi*ms.  
Furthermore, as distance was increased from sensor position one, the pressures 
and impulses decreased as anticipated. For the 60g C4 test, the peak pressure decreased 
from 8.73 psi to 1.48, and impulse decreased from 3.30 psi*ms to 1.56 psi*ms. The 120g 
C4 test saw pressure decrease from 11.67 psi to 1.96, and the impulse decrease from 4.89 
psi*ms to 2.49 psi*ms as distance increased from 5 to 15 feet. The pressure decreased 
from 18.55 psi to 2.87 psi, and the impulse decreased from 7.09 psi*ms to 4.14 psi*ms 
for the 240g C4 tests as the sensor distances to the charge increased from 5 to 15 feet. 
The key data from the open-air testing can be found in Table 3.1.  
 





Graphical representations of the pressure sensor waveforms from the 60-gram, 
120-gram, and 240-gram C4 test shots can be viewed in Appendix B. The positive phase 
duration was calculated using Formula 1. Maximum impulse was computed using 
Formula 3. The bag breakage results, with respect to distance, peak pressure, and 
maximum impulse for the 60, 120, and 240-gram charge weights are shown in Table 3.1. 
3.2.3. Open Air Testing Analysis. Only the position #1 (5 foot) bag broke 
during the 60g shot (Table 3.1). Each of the other bags for the 60g test remained 
unbroken. However, the 120g and 240g tests had bags that ruptured at pressures lower 
than some of those unbroken in the 60g test (Table 3.1). The bags that ruptured at lower 
pressures in the 120g and 240g tests than the 60g test experienced higher impulse values. 
This indicates the importance of impulse over pressure on the bag operation. 
The 120g test had bags break at the #1 and #3 positions (5 and 9 feet), while the 
bag at position #2 (7 feet) with higher pressure and impulse than that of the bag at 9 feet 
remained unbroken. The 240g test demonstrates the pressure inconsistency between the 
bags at positions #5 and #6 (13 and 15 feet) as seen in Table 3.1. The bag at 15 feet 
ruptured with a peak pressure and max impulse that were lower than the pressure and 
impulse observed at 13 feet. However, the bag at 13 feet was unbroken. There are many 
factors that may have contributed to these inconsistencies. However, when the 
combination Peak Pressure versus Impulse (P-I) diagram was assessed; trends began to 
emerge, see Figure 3.4. 
In analysis of the pressure-impulse versus damage diagram, there are no bags that 
broke near the reported 4.0 kPa (0.58 psi) threshold for claimed operation of the bags, as 




Figure 3.4: Open Air Bag Barrier Testing Pressure-Impulse versus Bag Damage 
 
break was 2.87 psi, or 19.79 kPa. However, this lowest pressure ruptured bag also had a 
significantly higher contributing impulse value. The data also shows four distinct regions 
of bag damage; an unbroken region where no bags break because the combination of 
pressure and impulse are too low, a transition region in which some bags break and others 
do not, a broken bag region where all the bags are at least splitting open, and a bag 
shredding region where the bags are likely to be completely shredded and dust released. 
This overall region of testing displayed in the open-air pressure-impulse diagram 
clearly defines the dynamic damage response region of the barrier bags. It also highlights 
the threshold for bag damage in this combination pressure and impulse range. This 
dynamic response region is typically the most difficult region to define. However, the 
open air-testing does not clearly define the impulse sensitive asymptotic region as well as 
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previously anticipated. Additional testing focused on a relatively high pressure (15 to 20 
psi) and relatively low impulse (1 to 3 psi*ms) would be required to help define this 
region better. 
In all cases of ruptured bags however, the contained dust was not dispersed but 
merely dropped straight down from the bag, if it came out of the ruptured bag at all, as 
seen in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. The orientations of the bags with respect to the blast wave, or 
the air pressure within the bags themselves, are two of the many possible factors that may 
have affected the bag breakage. The typical result of those bags that did rupture during 
the testing ranged from just a small tear to completely shredded at the closest distances, 
as seen in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Additional pictures of bag damage caused during the open-
air testing can be viewed in Appendix C. 
It is apparent that pressure alone is capable of rupturing the bags, if high enough. 
However, pressure alone is not the driving force for the dispersal of the stone dust 
contained within the barrier bags, as evidenced by a complete lack of dust dispersal in all 
open-air tests. In the open-air tests, those bags that did rupture either dropped their load 
straight to the ground, or the tearing of the bag was not sufficient to release the dust at all. 
It would appear then that it takes a combination of sufficient pressure to rupture the bag 
enough to release the dust, along with an adequate impulse to disperse the dust once it is 
released. This hypothesis was tested further with the testing performed in the shock 
tunnel. 
As discussed in Section 2.5 of this thesis, early bag barrier testing and 
development was performed at the Kloppersbos testing facility in RSA. This testing 












Figure 3.7: Picture Showing the Shredding of Bags Typical at Lesser Distances 
 
shock tunnel for their barrier bag testing. However, those researchers did not perform 
testing of the bags in open air. By only testing in a shock tunnel, the separate 
characteristics of the pressure and impulse effects cannot be distinguished, and the 
understanding of the bag barrier operation is incomplete. To illustrate this difference 
between the pressure and impulse effects on the barrier bags, the open-air testing was 
followed by additional testing in a shock tunnel located at the Missouri University of 
Science and Technology Experimental Mine Site. Though the shock tunnel used was of a 
different configuration than that of the South African facility, the pressure and impulse 
funneling effect experienced was sufficient to exhibit the distinction between the effects 
of each on the barrier bags. 
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3.3. SHOCK TUNNEL TESTS 
This experiment consisted of four test shots performed in a fabricated steel shock 
tunnel. The overall dimensions for the tunnel are approximately 65 feet long, by 6 to 8 
feet tall, by 3 to 6 feet wide. The height and width of the tunnel vary along the length 
using smooth transitions between the different sizes as seen in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9.  
The charges and stone dust bags were hung from hooks welded along the inside length of 
the tunnel roof at 2-foot intervals. All tests were performed with explosive charge sizes of 
40 grams of C4 to obtain a similar pressure range as in the open-air testing. The distance 
between the charge and the end of the tunnel nearest the charge was increased for each 
test. This effectively decreased the distance between the charge, and the pressure 
transducers and barrier bags which remained in the same locations for all tests. To 
prevent damage to the pressure transducers from rupturing bags, falling stone dust, and 
flying debris, testing performed on actual barrier bags was performed separately, but 
under the same stringent setup regiment to acquire the pressure data. The equipment and 
supplies required to perform the shock tunnel testing are listed in Appendix D. 
 
 




Figure 3.9: Dimensional Drawing of Fabricated Steel Shock Tunnel[47] 
 
3.3.1. Shock Tunnel Pressure Testing Method. The goal was to record the pressure versus 
time data of several tests, and analyze the recorded data to determine the peak pressure 
and calculate the maximum impulse attained. Additionally, the resulting damage, or lack 
of damage, to the barrier bags was recorded. This allowed direct correlation between the 
peak pressure, maximum impulse, and the damage to the bag barrier system. 
The shock tunnel has chain links welded to the inside of the roof at 2-foot 
intervals from the small opening end to the middle of its length. The charge hanging wire 
was attached to the chain link 4 feet from the small end of the tunnel with sufficient 
length to be able to hang the charge at the midpoint of the tunnel later. The six pencil 
probe pressure transducers were mounted in specially made holders attached to weighted 
camera tripods. A measurement of 35 feet was made from the small end of the tunnel, 
and the #1 sensor was fixed into position at the cross-sectional midpoint of the tunnel. 
Two sensors were located at the 43-foot distance from the small end of the tunnel, the #2 
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sensor at the midpoint horizontally and 1 foot from the floor, the #3 sensor at the cross-
sectional midpoint of the tunnel. At 51 feet from the small end of the tunnel, pressure 
transducer #4 was installed and fixed at the cross-sectional midpoint of the tunnel. At 57 
feet from the small end of the tunnel the #5 pressure transducer was fixed it at the cross-
sectional midpoint of the tunnel; while the #6 sensor was installed at the midpoint of the 
tunnel horizontally and 6.5 feet from the floor. Pressure sensor distances from the given 
charge are detailed in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Pressure Transducer to Charge Distance in Tunnel 
 
 
Upon completion of the pressure transducer setup, four of the six pressure 
transducers were collinear at the cross-sectional midpoint of the tunnel. The remaining 
two transducers were placed to monitor for pressure abnormalities near the floor and roof 
of the test tunnel. A standard blasting cap was prepared with a trigger wire pigtail taped 
over the end so the pigtail wire would be broken upon blasting cap detonation, signaling 
the time of detonation to the DAS. The previously prepared 40-gram C4 charge was hung 
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from the charge hanging wire at the cross-sectional midpoint of the tunnel at the specified 
distances (4, 12, 16, and 20 feet from the small end of tunnel) for each test. 
3.3.2. Shock Tunnel Barrier Bag Testing Procedure. Four barrier bags were 
tested separately using 40-gram C4 charges placed at 4, 12, 16, and 20 feet from the 
small end of the tunnel, the same setup as the pressure testing. The barrier bags were 
hung at the pressure transducer #4 location for all four of these tests. This location was 51 
feet from the small end of the tunnel, and was chosen because the range of pressures and 
impulses developed at this distance were within the range of the open-air testing. 
In all other facets, the shock tunnel bag testing was performed in the same manner 
as the shock tunnel pressure tests. The resulting effects of the explosion tests on the 
barrier bags was recorded, as well as the degree of dispersion of the enclosed stone dust. 
Dust dispersion classifications were based on visual observations and divided into three 
classes; no stone dust release, stone dust release but no dispersal of dust directed away 
from the explosive charge, and stone dust release with significant dispersal directed away 
from the charge. Steps required to prepare for additional tests were similar except that a 
new charge and blasting cap were prepared and hung at the different distances required 
for each respective test (4, 12, 16, and 20 feet from the small end of tunnel). Additionally, 
a new pre-filled barrier bag was hung at the same location for each test, and the stone 
dust dispersed from the previous test was swept out of the tunnel end. 
3.3.3. Shock Tunnel Testing Results. The results of the shock tunnel testing are 
important to help differentiate the pressure versus impulse effects of a mine explosion on 
the operation of the bag barrier system components. The understanding of this difference 
and the effect of the explosion impulse on the bag barrier system is imperative. Appendix 
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E contains the pressure and impulse data from the shock tunnel testing. Table 3.3 
compares the resulting maximum pressure and impulse values at the barrier bag location 
for each charge distance within the tunnel, with the observational results of the barrier 
bags after each test. The charge distance to the barrier bag ranged from 31 to 47 feet. The 
maximum pressure at the barrier bag location ranged from approximately 2.4 to 3.1 psi. 
The maximum positive impulse ranged from approximately 8.1 to 11.0 psi*ms at these 
distances. In all cases the barrier bags were ruptured with the contained dust having been 
dropped and dispersed to varying degrees. 
 
Table 3.3: Barrier Bag Damage versus Distance, Pressure, and Impulse 
 
 
3.3.4.  Shock Tunnel Testing Analysis. As the charge distance into the tunnel 
increased, the distance between the charge and the pressure transducer locations 
decreased. This is due to the fixed location of the sensors within the tunnel. The general 
trend for pressures and impulse was as expected, with lowest values occurring at longest 
charge to transducer distances, and largest values occurring at shortest charge to 
transducer distances; with the exception of the 12-foot test. The 12-foot test demonstrates 
how the incident and reflected shock waves can interact constructively at periodic 
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distances. The maximum pressures obtained during tunnel testing ranged from 2.0 to 5.2 
psi, at charge to transducer distances from 53 to 15 feet. The maximum positive impulse 
values ranged from 6.5 to 15.8 psi*ms at the same distances. Some slight variations to 
this trend in pressure can be noticed in the data for sensors 2 and 6. This is due to their 
location away from the collinear position of the other sensors and toward the floor and 
roof, and due to the reflection of the shock wave. The lack of major variations in arrival 
time between the collinear sensors and the ones mounted near the floor and roof indicate 
that the shock wave is planar when it reaches the sensors. 
The barrier bags were tested at sensor location 4. This yielded a charge to barrier 
bag distance that ranged between 31 and 47 feet for the various tests. The pressures 
obtained at sensor location 4 in the previous testing ranged from 2.3 to 3.1 psi; while the 
impulse values ranged from 8.1 to 11.0 psi*ms for those same distances to the sensor 4 
position. In all tests, the barrier bags ruptured and dispersed the contained dust to various 
degrees, unlike the open-air testing. The shorter charge to barrier bag distances, with 
resulting higher pressure and impulse values, consistently and clearly displayed a greater 
degree of bag tearing and dust dispersal than that of the greater charge to bag distances, 
as seen in Figure 3.10. Additional figures of the shock tunnel testing are contained in 
Appendix C (C2.1 – C2.3). 
By combining the shock tunnel testing data with the open-air testing data on the 
pressure impulse diagram, Figure 3.11, a new region is uncovered. This new region 
shows an area of dust dispersal at low pressure but relatively high impulse. This region 
helps to define the pressure sensitive asymptotic region of the bag specific pressure-
impulse graph. This indicates the importance of impulse on the release and dispersal of 
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dust at low pressures. Also, it appears that consistent dust dispersal begins to occur 
around 8psi*ms, as the open-air test bag that shredded had a significantly higher pressure, 
but an impulse value slightly lower than 8psi*ms, and no dust dispersal was noted.  
 
 
Figure 3.10: Picture Showing Bag Shredding and Dust Dispersal 
Typical of Shock Tunnel Testing 
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Also, all of the bags tested above 8psi*ms ruptured and dispersed dust. 
Unfortunately, the open air and shock tunnel testing left a region undefined in the 
pressure-impulse diagram, the impulse sensitive asymptotic region. To further define that 
region, some additional testing would be required to be designed and performed to focus 
on relatively high pressures in a much lower impulse region.  
 
 
Figure 3.11: Combined Bag Barrier Testing Pressure-Impulse versus Damage 
 
3.4. SUMMARY 
In performing testing of the barrier bags in open air versus a shock tunnel, a 
comparison can be made. This comparison depicts the impulse effects of an explosion on 
the barrier bags’ rupture and dust dispersal. In the open arena testing, a larger range of 
pressures, and higher overall pressure, were obtained (1.4 to 18.5 psi) versus that of the 
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shock tunnel testing (2.3 to 3.1 psi). Conversely, the shock tunnel testing developed a 
larger overall impulse (8.1 to 11.1 psi*ms) compared to the open arena testing (1.6 to 7.1 
psi*ms) but in that narrower range of pressure. By comparing the barrier bag rupture 
characteristics under these two diverse conditions, and resulting pressure and impulse 
parameters, it can clearly be seen that pressure alone cannot consistently rupture the bags 
unless it is veryrelatively high, and especially not to the extent that is required to dump 
and disperse the entire amount of contained stone dust. Furthermore, in zero open arena 
tests was stone dust dispersal noted. 
Moreover, by comparing the open arena testing to the tunnel testing, the 
importance of the shock impulse on the shredding of the bags, and the dropping and 
dispersal of the contained stone dust, became evident. The open arena test that resulted in 
the highest pressure and impulse values (18.5 psi and 7.0 psi*ms), displayed shredding of 
the bag and dropping of the contained stone dust, but no dispersal of the dust was noted. 
In effect, the bag shredded at the air gap and dropped the entire load of stone dust in one 
pile. Conversely, the tunnel test resulting in the lowest pressure and impulse values (2.3 
psi and 8.1 psi*ms) displayed similar bag shredding, but with reduced dust drop and 
increased dust dispersal directed away from the location of the charge. In all tunnel tests 
the barrier bags were shredded and the dust was partially dispersed. Only a handful of 
open arena tests at the highest pressures displayed shredding of the bag, while none of 






4. IMPLEMENTATION OF BAG TYPE PASSIVE EXPLOSION          
BARRIERS IN U.S COAL MINES 
4.1. MINE SITE TRIAL INSTALLATION OVERVIEW 
In order to determine if the bag barrier system could be implemented into 
American underground coal mines, arrangements were made with two cooperating 
underground longwall coal mines in the Eastern United States to install scaled length 
barrier arrangements in development entries within their mines. The barriers were to be 
left in place for 4 to 5 weeks, and then were inspected, sampled, and removed upon return 
to the mine. This length of time would allow both mines to advance the development of 
their respective entry through the barrier. Additionally, this would allow ample time for 
various development crews and other miners to work around and experience the bag 
barriers in place. 
Upon arrival to install the bag barriers, miners were surveyed on their knowledge 
of coal mine disasters, their causes, methods of coal dust explosion prevention, and their 
feelings of safety in their workplace. Upon return to inspect, sample, and remove the bag 
barriers the miners at each mine were again surveyed. This survey asked about their 
concerns and experiences with working around the bag barriers, their understanding of 
the barriers, and the bag barriers’ effect on their perceived safety. Additionally, miners 
and engineering staff were asked to give any input or suggestions for the improvement, 
adaptation, or implementation of the bag barriers into their mines. The results of these 





4.2. BAG BARRIER INSTALLATIONS 
Scaled length bag barriers were installed in 2 operating coal mines. They were 
both installed in the intake air entries ahead of major development. One was installed in 
the track entry, while the other was in the power and piping entry. The barriers were left 
in place for a month to allow time for the progression of mining development through the 
barrier areas. The following sections (4.2.1. and 4.2.2.) contain the details of installation. 
4.2.1. Trial at Mine #1. To prepare for the trial bag barrier setup at #1 mine, and to        
simulate how barrier bags arrive at mines internationally, the barrier bags were pre-filled 
with the required amount of stone dust, loaded into boxes, and shipped to the mine in 
advance. Some minor shipping damage to one corner of the container was visible upon 
arrival, and some of the bag hooks pierced the cardboard dividers and punctured the 
adjacent bags as seen in Figure 4.1. Twenty-two percent of the total shipment of barrier 
bags were damaged by transport or hook protrusion. This was due to inadequate shipping 
materials being used and could be easily addressed and corrected.   
 
  
Figure 4.1: Damage to Bags from Packing and Shipping to Mine 
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Roof mesh was absent in most locations throughout mine #1, and the bolt spacing 
was wider than conducive for the recommended bag spacing 0.4 to 1 meter (1.3 to 3.3 ft) 
as outlined earlier in Figure 2.2. To assist with a mounting alternative, various hooks 
were sourced and tested, of which three met the criteria for the installation atmosphere, 
cost, and load capacity. The hook options (Figure 4.2) were shipped to the #1 Mine site 
along with the prefilled barrier bags. The #3 Hook was quickly eliminated as a viable 
alternative because it did not work with the roof straps, and the top hook was bent too 
tightly to easily fit through the loop in the roof bolt plates. The #2 Hook worked well 
with the roof bolt plates, but not with the roof straps. The #1 Hook worked well with roof 
bolt plates and roof strap, but it was seen to have directionality; meaning should the bag 
or hook be pushed in the opposite direction to which it was installed, the #1 Hook could 
slide off and become dislodged from the bolt plate or roof strap. This condition is less 
than ideal for the bag barrier to function properly, as the bags could be dislodged from 




Figure 4.2: Hook Types Examined for Mounting Alternatives 
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 Since the roof bolt plate spacing was wider than the recommended barrier bag 
spacing, another method of supporting the barrier bags was needed. The challenge was to 
develop this method of support using supplies readily available within the mine. One 
such method employed, used an extra length of cable attached to the outermost bolt plate 
loop, threaded through each roof bolt plate loop in that row, and drawn tight at the 
opposite, outermost bolt plate loop using a small turnbuckle or bolt, nut, and washers 
(Figure 4.3). The barrier bags were then hung directly from the section of cable. Another 
method employed for hanging the barrier bags with recommended intra-row spacing 
involved the use of pre-made cables with hooks stretched between bolt plates using 
available hardware. Again, the barrier bags were hung directly from these cables (Figure 
4.4). The final method employed to hang the barrier bags with recommended intra-row 
spacing involved using available rubber coated cable hangers to span the distance 








Figure 4.4: Cable and Hook Support Method 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Rubber Coated Cable Hanger Support Method 
 
These three alternative support methods were implemented to show some of the 
possible means of hanging the bags with recommended spacing, should roof bolt plate 
spacing be too wide, and/or without the use of roof mesh. The majority of bags were 
hung directly from the bolt plates with the use of the #2 Hooks. The #2 Hooks were 
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necessary because the bag closure/hook does not fit through the bolt plate loop or on the 
roof strap mounting. The concern with using the #2 Hooks was the additional length that 
the barrier bags hang down; approximately 4 inches versus hanging the barrier bags 
directly. Once the installation was complete, a battery-operated scoop car was positioned 
to determine the amount of clearance between it and the hanging bag barrier (Figure 4.6). 
9-12 inches of clearance were observed, depending on the roof/floor conditions. 
Employees assisting with the installation can be seen as a frame of reference. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Scoop Car versus Bag Barrier Clearance 
 
 A Bag Barrier Supplies Calculator spreadsheet, based on UK standards and 
included in Appendix F, was created and used to determine the amount of stone dust and 
the number of bags and hooks required for different types of barrier installations. The 
maximum amount of stone dust and number of bags/hooks required would be 6,480 kg 
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(14,286 pounds) of stone dust and 1,080 bags and hooks per entry. For a three entry 
headgate and tailgate supporting a typical longwall section, that would equate to 38,880 
kg (85,716 pounds) of stone dust and 6,480 bags and hooks. The recommended locations 
to install these barriers in this section are the yellow highlighted areas in Figure 4.7. To 
install the barriers in this mine as depicted would require 64,800kg (142,860 pounds) of 
stone dust and 10,800 bags and hooks. Note that exact barrier lengths and positioning 
depend on the barrier configuration used; Figure 4.7 depicts the use of distributed 
barriers. The small red boxes are the recommended range in which the barrier should 
begin (approximately 200–400 feet from the longwall face or last open continuous miner 
crosscut). The trial barrier installation was completed in the Longwall #2 track entry, 
between breaks 19 and 21, approximately 800 feet from the face. The trial barrier 
installation location is the light green section (inside the red circle) in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Barrier Installation Location Mine #1 
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4.2.2.  Trial at Mine #2. No shipping damage was noted to the shipping cartons 
upon inspection at mine #2. However, similar hook puncture damage to the barrier bags 
occurred. Seventeen percent 17% of the bags, ones in the lower levels especially, suffered 
damage from this issue. In addition, several barrier bag closure and hook assemblies were 
bent and deformed by the weight of the layers of prefilled bags above. The #2 Mine used 
roof mesh in most entries on development, making barrier installation very 
straightforward. The only complication noted for installation of the barrier bags was the 
height of the mine roof (approximately 9 feet). A ladder was needed to hang the barrier 
bags (Figure 4.8) which increases the amount of time required for installation, causing 
increased costs of installation. The original bag closure and hook assembly was easy to 
hang directly on the roof mesh (Figure 4.9), although the mesh had to be pulled down 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Miner Hanging Bag from 8 Foot Ladder 
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away from the roof rock in some places to have enough clearance for the hook assembly 
to fit between the mesh and the rock. This raised concerns for potential damage to the 
hook over time as the roof mesh holds more load and fractured roof rock due to the 
spalling or flaking off of the roof rock layers. The Australian consultants reported that the 
added load of fractured roof rock is a non-issue in other countries utilizing the bag 
barriers. Due to the roof height, interference of the barrier bags with men or equipment 
was not expected to be an issue. There was approximately 1 foot of clearance over a 6 
feet tall miner and at least 2 feet of clearance over a scoop car (Figure 4.10). 
 
 




Figure 4.10: Scoop Car and Miner Clearance with Barrier Bags 
 
The Bag Barrier Calculator spreadsheet was again used to determine the amount 
of stone dust and the number of bags and hooks required for different types of barrier 
installations in mine #2. The completed sheet can be viewed in Appendix F. The 
maximum amount of stone dust and number of bags and hooks required would be 7,575 
kg (16,700 pounds) of stone dust distributed with 1,260 bags and hooks per entry. For a 
typical 3 entry headgate/tailgate combination would require 45,450 kg (100,200 pounds) 
of stone dust and 7,560 bags and hooks. The recommended locations to install these 
barriers are the yellow highlighted areas in Figure 4.11. To install the barriers as depicted 
in this mine, to protect the longwall and the continuous miner development, would 
require 90,900 kg (200,400 pounds) of stone dust and 15,120 bags and hooks. Note that 
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exact barrier lengths depend on the barrier configuration used; Figure 4.11 depicts each 
barrier as a distributed barrier. The green boxes are the recommended range in which the 
barrier should begin (approximately 200-400 feet from the longwall face or last open 
continuous miner crosscut). Note that the barrier near the continuous miner face must 
split at the gate-road/sub-main junction to meet minimum barrier length requirements, 
adding to the number of bags required. The trial barrier installation location is the light 
green section (inside the red circle) in Figure 4.11. Note that this map had not been 
updated to show recent progress; the top two panels had been fully mined, and the bottom 
two gate-roads had been fully developed. 
The purpose of installing partial bag barriers in active mines was to determine any 
potential issues with working around the system. The partial barriers were completed, and 
re-inspected upon return after 4 to 5 weeks, to examine the condition of the barriers and 
gain feedback from the miners. Additionally, management and labor forces were 
surveyed prior to installing the bag barriers and upon returning to the mine sites to 
inspect, sample, and remove the barriers regarding their interactions with, and opinions 
of, the bag barriers. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Trial Barrier Installation Location Mine #2 
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4.3. SURVEY RESULTS 
Both pre- and post- installation surveys were conducted with the members of the 
workforce who assisted with the partial barrier’s installation. Additionally, a follow up 
survey was conducted with those who worked around the barriers during the intermission 
between installation and re-inspection. Each of the surveys were given to employees from 
a variety of job classifications, including engineers, foremen, electricians, shuttle car 
operators, and safety foremen. These surveys gave vital feedback on various aspects of 
barrier installation and the effects they had on the performing of various job duties in the 
mine.  
4.3.1. Preliminary Survey. The preliminary survey contained six questions designed to 
determine the survey participants’ familiarity with methane and coal dust explosion 
hazards related to coal mining, as well as their familiarity with the bag barrier system 
itself (Table 4.1). Seven employees were available to assist with the installations at both 
mines. Of these, all were familiar with recent mine disasters caused by methane and coal 
dust explosions and the potential for such explosions in coal mines. Five of the seven 
employees believed current explosion prevention standards are inadequate, though two of 
these commented that the prevention methods used will never seem sufficient as long as 
ignitions still occur in U.S. mines. All survey participants believed that more should be 
done to prevent and mitigate coal dust explosions, however most also commented that 
prevention methods could always be made better. Only two of these miners were familiar 
with the bag barrier system, although both had only briefly heard of it and did not know 
any specific details. Note that one employee declined to comment on question 5. 
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Table 4.1: Preliminary Survey Results 
 
 
4.3.2. Post-Installation Survey. The post-installation survey consisted of ten 
questions designed to gain feedback from those who assisted with the trial barrier 
installation. Table 4.2 contains the results of the survey. Questions 3, 5, 7, and 9 asked for 
further explanation of positive responses to the prior question, and question 10 asked for 
additional comments. These questions are withheld from Table 4.2 but are discussed 
further below.  
All the miners felt the barrier was easy to install. Only one reported any 
installation difficulties; this employee worked in the mine that did not normally use roof 
mesh and reported issue with developing a method for hanging the bags at the appropriate 
spacing, as previously discussed. Many had suggestions for system improvement, and the 
same three concepts were heard from several different employees: (1) adding a wide 
circle around the hook assembly to protect the bag from damage due to falling roof rock, 
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(2) a redesign of the hook to decrease hanging length, and (3) a redesign of the hook to be 
stronger than the current plastic design. 
 
Table 4.2: Post-Installation Survey Results 
 
 
One of the miners assisting with the installation suggested a modified hook and 
closure design, which utilized a small hole with a free moving steel hook instead of a 
fixed plastic design (Figure 4.12). This allows for easy hanging of the bags from roof bolt 
plates, roof mesh, or cables without the additional length inherent to using the additional 
#2 Hooks. Also, the wire hook can lie flat, eliminating the transport damage issues that 
were observed. However, the design would not work on roof straps and would also need 
additional testing to verify that the bags would still operate properly. 
Four employees foresaw potential issues with the system. The three issues stated 
were: (1) damage to the bags during regular moving of power stations and cables, and 
belt conveyor systems, (2) additional labor required for bag installation as mining 
progresses, and (3) damage to the bags from rock falls. Concerns mentioned by 
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engineering staff during discussions were: the flammability of the bags themselves, 
MSHA approval for installing the bags in a U.S. coal mine, the need for dusting or 
maintaining dust on the outside of the bags, and the impedance to ventilation created by 
the installation of the barrier bags. A prominent concern was the added costs of the bags 
and hooks, along with the additional labor required to install and maintain the bag 
barriers. Furthermore, MSHA fines for non-compliance were a concern should the system 
become mandated, regulated, and inspected in America. 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Modified Closure/Hook Design Suggestion 
 
4.3.3.  Follow-Up Survey. Upon return to the mine sites after 5 weeks to inspect 
the barriers and sample the rock dust, mine employees on that shift who worked in the 
vicinity of the barrier systems were surveyed about any interactions they had with the 
barriers. Their feedback was collected and recorded. Table 4.3 shows the results of the 
surveys given to mine management, while Table 4.4 shows the results of the survey taken 
by the miners. 
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Regarding the management surveys, question 1 was directed more at mine #1 
since a directional hook/clip was used to hang many of the bags from the roof straps. It 
was unclear if this directionality of installation would allow the clips to become 
dislodged if they were bumped in the direction opposite of installation. From the survey 
results, it became apparent that this was not a large concern. The survey response options 
related to the number of bags, while the percentage value was the percentage of 
respondents who gave that number. 
The disparity between the number of bags broken at the different mines during the 
trials in question 2 (3 or less versus 50 or more) was due to the differences in the mines 
and trial locations within the mine. Mine #1 had a lower roof, and the barrier was 
installed in the track entry. Therefore, when the track was being laid through the area and 
power cables were being moved, the miners decided to remove the bags, set them aside, 
and reinstall them afterwards, rather than work around them. In doing so, the bags were 
damaged by rough handling and being set down on jagged bits of rock and coal alongside 
the ribs that poked holes in the bags. These holes would turn into tears upon being picked 
up and re-hung. Upon return to the mine and performing barrier inspection, only 35 
barrier bags of the original 114 that were hung survived being taken down and rehung. It 
was assumed that a small fraction of these were due to vandalism and pranks as well. 
This was confirmed by answers to question 3 concerning how the bags were broken. It 
was reported that some bags were cut by knives, meaning that the miners were pranking 
their co-workers by getting them to stand under a bag, then “dusting” them by cutting the 
bag open and letting the dust fall onto them. However, the majority of bag damage was  
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reported to have been caused by moving the bags, laying track, and unloading supplies. It 
was also reported that zero accidents or injuries were caused by the bag barriers and the 
workers’ interactions with them. 
 
Table 4.3: Mine Site Management Survey 
 
 
Table 4.4: Combined Mine Site Labor Survey 
 
 
Regarding the labor surveys, 80% of workers in the vicinity of the barrier trials 
had some interaction with the barriers; while 93.3% of miners understood the purpose of 
the barriers. The same 6.7% that did not understand the bag barrier’s purpose in question 
2 did not respond to question 3. The purpose of the bag barrier was explained to 20% of 
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the workers who were unaware of its intended purpose, while the remainder learned of 
the bag barriers’ purpose from their co-workers. The collection of problems experienced 
with the barrier systems, and reported in question 4, were that the bags were: easy to bust 
open or tear, hung too low, and were generally in the way. The main problem 
experienced and reported was torn or busted bags. 
Some problems that miners could foresee with the bag barriers as mining 
progressed, and reported by question 5, were: advancing the bags as mining progresses 
due to broken bags, difficulty hauling prefilled bags through the mine and hanging them 
where required, the related costs, and locating them to avoid accidental destruction. 
Suggestions made for system improvement in question 6 were to use stronger bags that 
did not hang down so low, place them in the returns only, leave them stationary at high 
points in the mine, and to develop a “single unit” installation rather than hundreds of 
individual bags. However, many of these suggestions do not take into account the design 
principles of the bag barrier system. Stronger bags would not rupture at lower explosion 
pressures, smaller bags that did not hang so low would not contain adequate amounts of 
rock dust, explosions occur and travel down all entries not just the returns, and the 
logistics of trying to mount and hang a single unit that contained sufficient rock dust is 
impractical in the confines of an underground mine. 
According to question 7, only 13.3% of the miners had considered intentionally 
breaking a bag to prank coworkers, or to get the bag out of their way. Forty-six and seven 
tenths percent (46.7%) of miners reported that having bag barrier systems in place would 
enhance their sense of workplace safety, 33.3% said that it wouldn’t, and 6.7% reported 
that it ‘may’ enhance their sense of workplace safety. The surveys were undertaken by a 
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wide cross section of employees, including: scoop operators, roof bolters, laborers, shift 
and production foremen, safety officers, electricians, mechanics, and even an MSHA 
Inspector on site that day. 
4.3.4. Analysis of Mine Surveys. The mine surveys provided valuable 
information regarding the implementation of the bag barrier system into operating mines 
in the United States. All the miners surveyed indicated their desire for additional 
safeguards against deadly coal dust explosions. The miners rated the bag barrier system 
an easy installation, and 86% felt safer with the barriers in place. Most importantly, zero 
injuries were incurred due to the bag barrier system being in place. These results indicate 
the miners are in favor of an additional layer of safety. If the miners want and approve of 
an added safety measure, such as the bag barrier system, they are more likely to help 
support, implement, and promote its proper use. This is an important consideration for a 
mine manager considering the implementation of such a safeguard. 
4.4. BARRIER BAG MOISTURE INTRUSION STUDY 
A major concern that was raised by mine site engineers and laborers during the 
trials was the barrier bags’ ability to prevent moisture contamination of the enclosed 
stone dust over time. To address this concern, a 12-month study on moisture 
contamination of the enclosed rock dust was performed at the Missouri S&T 
Experimental Mine. Additionally, barrier bags from each mine site trial installation were 






4.4.1. Year-Long Study at Missouri S&T. The portion of the S&T Experimental 
Mine that was used for a long-term trial installation of the bag barrier system was of 
comparative width and height dimensions as the two operating mine site trials. This 
section had roof mesh installed, simplifying barrier bag installation. The distance 
required to construct a full-scale barrier was not available in the Missouri S&T 
Experimental Mine. So, a reduced length trial installation was performed, which 
maintained the recommended bag and row spacing but reduced the total number of rows. 
A total of 35 bags were hung (Figure 4.13).  The roof height required a ladder to hang the 
bags. Several bags were broken during installation from being handled too roughly. 
The scaled bag barrier installation at the Missouri S&T experimental mine was be 
left in place for 12 months; and the dust from 20% of the bags (labeled in Figure 4.13) 
was periodically tested for moisture content using ASTM specification C25-11; the full 
procedure can be referenced for more information on the ASTM website. In addition, the 
supply of dust used to fill the barrier bags was initially sampled and tested. To conclude 
the long-term trial, samples were taken from all 35 bags and analyzed for moisture 
content as well. The bags themselves were also inspected for any damage that would 
have allowed excess moisture intrusion. 
4.4.2. Results of Missouri S&T Moisture Intrusion Study. The dust used to 
fill the bags was sampled and tested (Jan. 13, 2016), and results showed a beginning 
average moisture content by weight of 0.0428%. Approximately one and a half months 
later (Mar. 2, 2016), the dust contained in bags labeled 1-7 were sampled and analyzed. 
This analysis resulted in an average moisture content by weight of 0.0788%, an increase 




Figure 4.13: Missouri S&T Bag Barrier Layout 
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Approximately three months later (May 31, 2016), the dust in bags 1-7 was 
sampled and tested again; resulting in an average moisture content by weight of 0.0724%. 
It was noted that the dust contained in bag 5 was completely saturated due to a hole in the 
bag near the retaining ring that allowed water sitting on top of the hook assembly to leak 
into the bag. Therefore bag 5 results were not figured into the period average. Upon 
testing it was found that bag 7 had a significantly higher moisture content (3.8684%). It 
was assumed that this was also due to a hole in the bag allowing water intrusion, and was 
verified during the next sampling period. For this reason, bag 7 was also excluded from 
the period average. 
Approximately three months later (Sept. 1, 2016), the dust in bags 1-7 was 
sampled and tested again; resulting in an average moisture content by weight of 1.1656%. 
Bag 5 was still saturated, and therefore excluded from the period average. Bag 7 was 
verified to have a hole in the bag near the retaining ring, and the moisture content by 
weight of bag 7 was 14.2423%. Therefore, bag 7 was again excluded from the period 
average as an extreme outlier. It is of note that several bags showed a significant increase 
in moisture content during this period; bag 6 had increased significantly to 4.5946%, bag 
3 had increased to 1.2287%, and bag 1 had increased to 0.3581%. It was considered that 
these bags may have small holes in them near the retaining ring, and was verified during 
the final sampling. An additional bag that had been undisturbed since the test inception 
(labeled xx) was also sampled and analyzed, resulting in a moisture content by weight of 
0.1054%; a 146% increase by weight since the beginning, but the contained dust was still 
not caked and was readily dispersible. 
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At the conclusion of the extended trial, approximately 4 months later (Jan. 4, 
2017), the same bags were once again sampled and tested. Bags 5 and 7 had over 16% 
moisture content by weight and were once again excluded from the period average as 
extreme outliers. The average of the remaining 5 bags was 1.5626%; however, this value 
was skewed high by bag 6 which had 6.0225% moisture content. See Table 4.5 for the 
complete year-long moisture content testing data of the seven test bags. 
 As previously stated, all bags were sampled and analyzed at the conclusion of the 
12-month trial; the results of which can be seen in Appendix G. The overall average 
moisture content by weight of all 35 bags was 2.3309%. It is important to note that only 
samples from 9 of the 35 bags (25.7% of the bags) were above 1% moisture by weight 
after 1 year. Of those 9 bags, the 7 with the highest moisture contents (>6% of the bags) 
were inspected and found to have holes in the bags near the locking ring which allowed 
excess moisture into the bags. If these 7 bags that had holes or other damage and 
excessively high moisture contents are removed from the averaging calculation, the 
resulting average becomes 0.3670% moisture content. Figure 4.14 is a graphical 
comparison of the ending (1 year) moisture content of all 35 bags. Figure 4.15 tracks the 
moisture content of bags 1-7 over the entire 12-month time period. 
4.4.3. Analysis of Moisture Intrusion Study Data. The barrier bags were tested against 
moisture intrusion and contamination of the enclosed stone dust. The long-term testing 
was performed under extreme temperature and humidity swings due to the trial location 
in a shallow, short, highly fractured limestone adit portal. It was found through inspection 
of dust samples during moisture content analysis that the saturation point of the supplied 
dust is reached at about 16%, and that dust caking was beginning to occur on a limited  
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Figure 4.14: Ending (1 Year) Moisture Content of all 35 Bags 
 
basis at just over 2% moisture by weight. Approximately 75% of the bags tested were 
below 1% moisture by weight. If the 7 bags that were found to be damaged at the end of 
the testing period are removed from the calculation, the overall average of the remaining 
dust becomes 0.3670% moisture by weight, which is well below the moisture level 
required to begin caking. The results indicate positive performance of the bags in 
conditions worse than would be experienced in an underground coal mine. This indicates 
that moisture contamination of the rock dust enclosed in the barrier bags is not a concern 
in a coal mine so long as the bag remains intact. This means that the enclosed dust will 





Figure 4.15: Moisture Content over Time of 7 Test Bags 
 
4.5. SUMMARY 
Bag Barrier installations were performed in two separate underground coal mines 
in the Eastern United States. The trials were undertaken to determine whether or not the 
bag barrier system could be effectively installed in an American coal mine, what 
difficulties would be experienced, and how could those difficulties be overcome. The two 
mines used represented differing mining heights and roof support methods, but similar 
ventilation practices. The mine that used roof mesh on development in all areas 
experienced no difficulties with installation besides the tall roof height (9 feet) requiring 
the use of a ladder to hang the bags. The mine utilizing roof straps and bolt plates 
required the adapting of other supplies (cables, hooks, turnbuckles, clevises, etc.) to 
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provide a method of support for the bags to be hung at the recommended spacing. This 
would add significant labor and material costs to implement in a full-scale operating 
mine. 
The mine management, engineering, and labor crews at both mines were surveyed 
prior to the trial bag barrier installation, immediately after the installation was complete, 
and again after the barriers were in place for four to five weeks. This extended time 
allowed the mine’s crews to work around and interact with the bag barriers. Every miner 
surveyed stated that they thought more should be done to prevent and mitigate coal dust 
explosions, yet only 29% of them had heard of the bag barrier system. After helping to 
install the trial barriers, the miners ranked the bag barrier system a 1.4, on a scale of 1 to 
5, in terms of ease of installation. Zero injuries occurred as a result of the bag barrier 
installations or during their month-long trial, and 86% of miners stated that they would 
have an improved sense of workplace safety with full scale bag barriers in place. In all, 
the trial bag barrier installations proved successful, and were a valuable source of 
information and feedback. 
An early concern among the mine site engineering staff was the barrier bags’ 
ability to prevent moisture intrusion and contamination of the enclosed stone dust which 
would cause the dust to cake or clump together. To investigate this concern, a year-long 
moisture intrusion study was performed in the Experimental Mine at the Missouri 
University of Science and Technology, and can be taken as a worst-case scenario. The 
location in the adit portal close to the surface and equidistant between the portal and 
ventilation shaft assure wild swings in temperature and humidity. At times there was 
standing water up to 6 inches deep below the bag arrangement, and water dripping 
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through the mine roof onto the bags like rain due to the fractured limestone cover. These 
conditions are more extreme than that experienced in a typical deep coal mine. Even still, 
if only the bags without physical holes or other damage are considered, the dust 
contained in the remaining 28 bags averaged 0.3670% moisture by weight. Additionally, 
dust collected and tested from mine sites #1 and #2 contained 0.1435% and 0.1360% by 
weight of moisture. The results of the year-long moisture intrusion study along with those 
of the mine site testing indicate that moisture contamination of the rock dust enclosed in 


















5. REQUIRED CHANGES OR IMPROVEMENTS FOR USE OF BAG         
TYPE EXPLOSION BARRIERS IN U.S. COAL MINES 
5.1. OVERVIEW OF REQUIRED CHANGES 
There are many technical aspects to be considered, besides installation logistics, 
in regard to adapting the bag barrier systems currently used in other countries to 
underground coal mines in the United States. Some of the main points considered here 
are 1) the effects of mine type and layout differences, 2) coal seam and mining height 
differences, 3) roof support system differences, and 4) ventilation system differences on 
the bag barrier system components and barrier configurations and layouts within the 
mines. Though there are many other site-specific issues and obstacles to consider, they 
are merely technical obstacles that must be planned and accounted for in the barrier 
design and placement at each individual site; just as it is done in the many foreign mines 
that currently employ them. This section outlines the primary considerations for 
implementing the bag barrier system into American coal mines, and makes suggestions 
for their installation based on previous research, operating mine site trials in the U.S., and 
explosives tests to understand the operational characteristics of the bags themselves. 
5.2. BAG BARRIER SYSTEM LAYOUT OR DESIGN CHANGES 
The principles of coal dust explosions are similar in U.S. and foreign mines alike. 
Additionally, the bag barrier system design in each country utilizing them is based off the 
same research and testing performed at the Kloppersbos, Tremonia, and NIOSH Lake 
Lynn underground experimental mine testing facility in the United States. Therefore, 
many of the design characteristics for bag barrier installation in the U.S. can be adapted 
from installation guidelines currently used in foreign nations. However, the U.S. does 
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utilize distinctive mine layout and ventilation schemes that could cause changes to the 
typical bag barrier system installations and designs employed elsewhere. The following 
subsections discuss the areas in which the bag barrier system may differ between 
installation in the U.S. and other countries; as well as proposing which design aspects the 
U.S. is likely to copy from the foreign nations. 
5.2.1. Coal Seam and Mining Height Differences. While there are many 
differences between the underground coal mines in countries that currently use bagged 
stone dust explosion barrier systems and U.S. mines, none were discovered that would 
prevent the successful implementation or operation of the bagged stone dust barrier 
system in its current form. That is, aside from mines with very short seam and roof 
heights, which physically preclude them from accommodating a bagged stone dust 
explosion barrier system due to the length of the hook and bag system. Similar to foreign 
mines with greater mining heights or roof cavities, American mines would also require 
additional layers of barrier bags to be installed in these instances.  
Typically, U.S. mines have much lower average opening heights than mines in 
NSW, the UK, and the RSA. Since the required stone dust loading for a bag barrier is 
based on the cross-sectional area of the mine entry in which the barrier is installed, 
American coal mines may require fewer bags. However, the potential for these savings 
are limited since current NSW, RSA, and UK guidelines have limitations on the 
maximum spacing between bags and the minimum weight of rock dust per bag. Potential 
also exists that low mine heights may render the bag barrier system installation futile if 
heights are low enough to guarantee damage to the barrier bags from moving equipment 
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and personnel. It is possible that adjustments may be made to the barrier design to 
accommodate mines with lower opening height. Some of these possibilities are:  
1. Concentrate barrier bags towards the ribs, with a large gap between the bags in 
the center, to provide a full height roadway and limit damage to the bags from 
equipment movement. 
2. Load bags with more rock dust near the rib and less in bags near the center, 
allowing shorter bags in the center. 
3. Load all bags with less dust (thereby reducing bag hanging height across the 
entire roadway) and hang rows closer together to maintain proper stone dust 
loading. 
4. Design shorter bags with less airspace to be used in mines with lower seam 
height. 
Research has not been performed to evaluate the effects of any such changes on the coal 
dust explosion mitigation performance of the bag barrier system, and none of these 
changes should be implemented until further research has been performed and proven 
that the bag barrier system remains effective in these altered configurations. 
5.2.2. Roof Support System Differences. Roof support requirements in coal 
mines vary throughout the world. Some locations and regulatory regimes require roof 
mesh everywhere in a mine; while others leave the decision as to which method of 
support to use, and where, up to that specific mine or inspector. This disparity in roof 
support methods, and that of labor costs worldwide, has given rise to two common 
methods for barrier installation in those nations that use them. The first method is to use 
existing roof support materials (roof mesh, roof bolt plates, roof straps, etc.) to hang the 
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barrier bags from, leaving them in place and installing new bags on the advancing end of 
the barrier as mining progresses. In many nations this is easily performed as roof mesh is 
required throughout the mines. This method requires purchasing a greater supply of bags 
and stone dust, but it is less labor intensive since the bags are never repositioned once 
they are hung. The second method of bag barrier installation utilizes separate movable 
stands for each row of barrier bags to hang from. As mining progresses the farthest 
movable stand is relocated to the front of the barrier closest to the mining face. 
Additional stands would be required for extra tall mines or roof cavities requiring 
additional layers as described in the previous section. This method reduces overall 
material costs by requiring considerably less bags and stone dust, though it is much more 
labor intensive. 
Unlike NSW where roof mesh is required throughout the mine, the United States 
is similar to RSA and the UK only requiring roof mesh where it is necessary. However, 
comparable to NSW and the UK, the labor costs in the United States are relatively high. 
Therefore, it is anticipated that U.S. coal mines would choose to install bag barriers using 
the first method of installing additional bags as opposed to moving existing ones. 
Unfortunately, U.S. mines that do not currently install roof mesh will have additional 
expenses to install roof mesh where needed for barrier installation, install additional roof 
bolts for proper bag spacing, or develop an appropriate and more cost-effective 
alternative system for hanging the bags at the required spacing. 
5.2.3. Mine Type and Layout Differences. Mining methods are one of the 
primary differences between underground coal mines in the U.S. and the other nations 
that use bag barriers. In the U.S., room-and-pillar mines are similar in number to longwall 
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mines, and are both often found in different areas of the same mine. In the UK and NSW, 
room-and-pillar mines are virtually non-existent. In the RSA, room-and-pillar mines 
makeup a majority of the mines. The room-and-pillar mining method results in a 
significantly larger area of open workings because there are a greater number of entries in 
each panel, submain, and main tunnel. The greater number of entries is necessary for both 
increased extraction and ventilation purposes. Therefore, room-and-pillar mines that wish 
to install bag barriers will have more entries to cover with bag barriers, meaning a greater 
supply of bags and stone dust must be purchased. This required supply of barrier 
materials will be even greater if the mine decides to leave the bags hanging in place and 
add additional bags as mining progresses. In longwall mining, much of the mined-out 
area is immediately covered by the gob and open workings are reduced to a minimum. 
This also reduces the supply of barrier materials required. 
In NSW, barrier installation is only required in ventilation returns and belt entries, 
though it is recommended that mines installing the bag barrier system use a risk-based 
approach to evaluate the necessity of placing additional barriers in other entries as well. 
Assuming that an American coal mine has decided to install a complete bag barrier on the 
pre-existing room-and-pillar panel shown in Figure 5.1; the blue shaded areas in the 
entries are the required bag barrier locations according to regulations and guidelines used 
in NSW. The start and end locations of the barriers must be maintained within certain 
distances from the face, so additional bags will be installed inby as mining progresses. 
For this mine, entry A is the return, entry B contains a conveyor belt, and entry C is the 
fresh air intake. According to NSW regulations, barriers are only required in entries A 
and B, not in the intake (entry C). In NSW, individual mines will decide if they want to 
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place barriers in the intake entries or other areas of the mine. Since barriers are not 




Figure 5.1: Bag Barrier Locations for an Example Room and Pillar Mine 
 
Unlike room-and-pillar mines, longwall mines are more likely to place bag 
barriers in all entries. This is because a longwall panel’s development section on the 
headgate side (intake) becomes the tailgate side (return) of the next adjacent panel. 
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Therefore, it is generally easier to install the barrier in all panel development entries 
including intake entries. Assuming that a U.S. mine has decided to install a bag barrier on 
the pre-existing longwall panel with one bleeder, shown in Figure 5.2; the blue shaded 
areas in the entries are the required bag barrier locations according to regulations and 
guidelines used in NSW. The start and end locations of the barriers must be maintained 
within certain distances from the face, so additional bags will be installed outby as 
mining progresses. For the development section on the headgate side at this mine, entry A 
is the return, entry B is the intake, and entry C has a conveyor belt. According to NSW 
regulations, barriers are only required in entries A and C, not in the intake (entry B). On 
the tailgate side however, entries A, B, and C are all returns, and each of these entries 
require barriers. However, if another longwall panel will be created to the left side of this 
panel, then the headgate for this panel will become the tailgate for the next panel. 
5.2.4. Ventilation System Differences. There are two primary differences 
between ventilation systems in the U.S. and those in NSW, the UK, and the RSA. The 
first regards longwall panel ventilation. In most U.S. longwall mines, bleeder systems are 
used which have entries at the inby end of the panel behind the gob, as seen in Figure 5.2. 
NSW and UK mines almost exclusively use U-system ventilation schemes, which do not 
have these additional bleeder entries. RSA mines use various ventilation systems, though 
bleeder systems are rare. It is possible that U.S. mines may be required to protect the 
bleeder entries in addition to areas normally protected, which would be an additional cost 
not seen in the other nations that do not utilize a bleeder system. Figure 5.3 shows the 
scenario for the mine in Figure 5.2 if that mine had chosen to install bag barrier systems 




Figure 5.2: Bag Barrier Locations for an Example Longwall Panel 
 
entries, which does not allow adequate distance to complete the required length for the 
barrier. Therefore, the barrier is split, and the additional required length is continued in 
each adjacent entry or crosscut for the panel. For future panels, production begins at the 
inby end of the panel, which means protecting the bleeder entries will require bags to be 
installed in all entries in the bleeder area and all crosscuts adjacent to the gateroads. 
Installing a bleeder protecting barrier on an existing mid-production panel would require 
installation inby the working face, which is generally considered dangerous and workers 
are not allowed in these areas. In the interest of safety, this mine may decide instead to 
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avoid barrier installation on this panel, and to hang bags for future panels throughout the 
headgate and bleeder entries and crosscuts during further development. 
The second difference between the U.S. and NSW, UK, and RSA mine ventilation 
schemes is the neutral airway. In the U.S., the belt is required to be in neutral airways, but 
neutral airways are not required at all in these other three nations. This means that the 
U.S. will have at least one additional entry in each longwall panel to install barriers in 
compared with these three other nations. According to current guidelines barrier 
installation is only necessary in the returns for mains, submains, and room-and-pillar 
panels; though it is recommended to install barriers in all entries. If U.S. mines choose to 
install in all entries, U.S. mines will have at least one additional entry to install bags in all 
portions of the mine. 
5.3. SUMMARY 
There are many technical aspects to be considered, besides installation logistics, 
in regard to adapting the bagged stone dust barriers currently used in other countries to 
underground coal mines in the United States. However, aside from mines with very short 
seam and roof heights, which physically preclude them from accommodating a bagged 
stone dust explosion barrier system due to the length of the hook and bag system, all of 
the other impediments to adapting these barrier systems to U.S. coal mines are merely 
technical obstacles that must be planned and accounted for in the barrier design and 
placement at each site; just as it is in the foreign mines that currently employ them. If 
used as outlined in other countries, the differences in ventilation practices and mining 
methods utilized in the U.S. would require additional bag barriers due to the use of 




Figure 5.3: Bag Barrier Locations for an Example Longwall 
Panel, Including Bleeder Barriers 
 
Additionally, the greater number of entries utilized for room and pillar mining 
methods in the U.S. would require additional bag barriers. These additional barrier 
requirements would presumably come with an increased cost. That is, unless further 
research would uncover ways to optimize the bag arrangements, spacing, or loading for 
the generally smaller mine entries in the U.S. which could reduce costs. It is 
recommended that a risk-based approach be taken with determining the most appropriate 
locations for the installation of barrier systems in each mine. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
6.1. PROJECT OVERVIEW 
The most significant and powerful hazard that exists in an underground coal mine 
is a coal dust explosion. A coal dust explosion has the potential to propagate to every part 
of a mine resulting in massive damage to the mine and equipment, as well as tragic loss 
of life. Since the beginning of coal mining in the U.S., thousands of lives have been lost 
to coal mine explosions. More recently, disasters due to coal dust explosions in U.S. 
underground coal mines have caused 59 deaths since 2001; including 29 deaths in a 
single mine explosion at the West Virginia Upper Big Branch (UBB) mine in 2010. In the 
same time period since 2001, in NSW, RSA, and the UK there have been no deaths 
attributed to coal dust explosions at all. The primary and most significant difference in 
safety standards between the U.S. and the others during this time is the mandatory use of 
explosion barriers by the other countries. The lack of explosion deaths in foreign coal 
mines since the implementation of explosion barriers demonstrates the positive impact 
the barriers have had in foreign mines. It is therefore theorized that the U.S. mining 
industry could also benefit from reduced coal mine explosion deaths due to the 
implementation of explosion barriers in underground coal mines in the United States. 
Prior to the mandatory implementation of explosion barriers in U.S. mines, 
similar to the bag type barrier, a greater understanding of their operational requirements 
and limitations are needed. This project brought together coal mining industry leaders, 
researchers, and regulators to begin dialogue regarding the possible implementation of 
the bag type passive explosion barrier system into U.S. coal mines in the future. These 
conversations centered on various aspects of importance to begin the evaluation of the 
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product and its application. Of decidedly high importance were the operational 
characteristics of the bags themselves to various shock and pressure stimulus. In addition, 
long-term moisture contamination of the stone dust contained within the bags was of 
concern. Finally, the logistics of actually installing the bag barrier systems in U.S. coal 
mines, along with the durability of the bags to withstand the rigors of daily mining 
operations was of significant interest. This project addressed these issues individually, 
having a significant impact on the future research and possible implementation of the bag 
type passive explosion barrier system in U.S. coal mines. 
6.2. PROJECT IMPACTS 
This research project was comprised of 3 main objectives. Each objective had 
specific impacts that positively affected the outcome of the project goals. The completion 
of each objective was also required to support the goals of this thesis. The following three 
sections outline each objective and their related impacts. 
6.2.1. Objective 1: Operation of Bag Type Passive Explosion Barriers. The purpose 
of Objective 1 was to understand the principle operational characteristics of the bag type 
passive explosion barriers. This was needed so that nothing in the fundamentals of 
operation of the bag barriers would be overlooked in their application and 
implementation into the diverse and dynamic environments found in U.S. The operation 
of the barrier bags was divided into two main categories, or actions. The first of which is 
the actual tearing or rupturing of the anisotropic bags. The second being the dispersal of 
the contained stone dust. Both are required to extinguish a developing coal dust 
explosion; however, these two operational aspects are of different genesis. 
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To clarify the difference between the forces acting to tear or rupture the bags and 
those acting to disperse the contained stone dust, two experimental tests were designed 
and completed. To differentiate between the pressure required to rupture the bag and that 
necessary to disperse the contained rock dust, one testing parameter was changed. One 
set of tests were performed in open air. The second set of tests were performed in a 
fabricated rectangular shock tunnel to simulate the confinement and focusing of the 
explosion impulse, similar to that which occurs naturally in an underground mine 
working. The results of the open-air testing revealed that the damage to the barrier bags is 
reliant on a combination of pressure and impulse, and can be broken down into 4 distinct 
regions. The first pressure-impulse region is an unbroken bag region, no bags were 
broken in this area of pressure and impulse. Second was a transition region where some 
bags break and some do not. The third area was a broken bag region, where all bags 
tested broke. Finally, a shredded bag pressure-impulse region in which the bags tested 
were completely shredded. Additionally, during the open air testing the contained stone 
dust was only dropped from the ruptured bags, but not dispersed, and only at the highest 
shock pressure levels. Furthermore, the open-air testing results show that the bags begin 
to tear or rupture at higher pressures than that reported by the bag barrier system 
distributors.   
The confined tunnel tests displayed complete rupture or tearing of all bags tested, 
and incrementally greater degrees of dispersal of the contained stone dust with higher 
impulse values. The results of these tests indicate that the barrier bags do not operate (tear 
and disperse) on pressure alone, and demonstrates the importance of the explosion 
impulse on dispersal of the contained stone dust and the subsequent extinguishing of a 
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developing coal dust explosion. These discoveries will have a great impact on the 
understanding of principle operation of the barrier bags and the future testing and 
development of alternative products and methods. 
6.2.2. Objective 2: Implementation of Bag Type Passive Explosion Barriers 
in U.S Coal Mines. Objective 2 allowed for interaction with mine site executives, 
engineers, and laborers while experiencing the finer points of barrier installation under 
two different sets of mine conditions. Of significance is the fact that one mine utilized 
roof mesh on development in all entries; and the other roof bolted, and only used mesh 
where needed. The bag barrier installation at the mine with roof mesh was very straight-
forward with the bags hanging directly on the mesh from their included hook. This 
method allowed for a large degree of adaptability and spacing options. The roof bolted 
mine required some additional work and site devised alternative support methods to allow 
hanging the bags at the correct spacing. Alternatively, the roof bolt spacing could be 
reduced, and an extra bolt placed in each row, to allow for hanging the bags at the correct 
spacing, directly from the roof bolt plates. 
In either case, the installations were completed successfully, with adequate 
personnel and equipment clearance, and left in place for 5 weeks. This time allowed for 
mine development past the barriers, and miner and equipment interactions with the 
barriers. The miners and engineering staff were surveyed prior to barrier installation, 
immediately following the completion of barrier installations, and again upon return to 
the mines after 5 weeks to sample and remove the barriers. The preliminary surveys 
indicated that 100% of the miners were familiar with recent mine explosion disasters and 
the risks of explosions in coal mines, and that more should be done to prevent such 
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disasters. However, only 21% of the miners were familiar with the bag type explosion 
barrier system. The post-installation survey revealed that miners thought the barrier 
system was easy to install (1.4 on scale from 1 to 5), and that 86% of the miners claimed 
they would have an improved sense of workplace safety with a full-scale explosion 
barrier system in place. The follow up visit surveys showed that no injuries occurred as a 
result of the barrier bag arrangements. The miners reported some experiences with the 
barrier bags such as they were too easy to break, they hung too low, and were in the way 
when laying track, moving power cables and piping, or unloading equipment from rail 
cars. 
The contamination of the dust enclosed in the bags by moisture was of high 
interest. A year-long moisture intrusion study was performed in the Experimental Mine 
on the campus of Missouri University of Science and Technology. A supply of stone dust 
was tested for moisture content, then bagged and hung in the mine adit. The dust in the 
bags was periodically tested for moisture content throughout a year’s time. Additionally, 
the dust from the barrier bags used in the mine site trial installations was tested. The 
campus test was seen as a worst-case scenario since the location of the bags in the adit 
was prone to wild swings in temperature and humidity that would not likely be 
experienced in a deeper underground mine complex with constant ventilation flow. 
Furthermore, there were periods when there was standing water below the barrier 
arrangement due to the inflow of water through the highly fractured limestone roof in the 
mine portal. The results of this study indicate that the contamination of the contained 
stone dust by moisture intrusion is not a concern, so long as the bags remain intact and 
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without holes. Bags that acquire holes, and become contaminated with moisture, can be 
easily spotted upon visual inspection and replaced if needed. 
The outcomes of Objective 2 are significant for many reasons. First, it proves that 
the bag type explosion barrier system can be implemented into different underground 
U.S. coal mines with minor modifications as required for mine site-specific concerns. 
This is similar to the numerous minor adjustments required by the multitude of foreign 
mines that utilize this technology. It also indicates that miners think the system is easy to 
install and that they would have an improved sense of workplace safety with explosion 
barriers in place. A deep held concern for the contamination of the enclosed stone dust by 
moisture intrusion was also addressed and shown to be a non-issue. These items address 
many concerns expressed by industry leaders, researchers, and regulators when 
discussions began regarding the possible implementation of the bag barrier system into 
U.S. coal mines. These discoveries lay the groundwork for future studies by eliminating 
some preliminary obstacles and answering some fundamental questions. 
6.2.3. Objective 3: Required Changes or Improvements for Use of Bag Type 
Explosion Barriers in U.S. Coal Mines. There are a large number of differences from 
one coal mine to another, not to mention the differences between mines in different 
regions or countries. Aside from the technical differences, there are other aspects to 
consider as well. However, excepting mines with very short seam or roof heights, which 
physically preclude them from utilizing bag barriers due to the hanging length of the 
bags, all of the other impediments to adapting these barrier systems to U.S. coal mines 
are merely technical obstacles that must be planned and accounted for in the barrier 
design and placement at each site; just as it is in the foreign mines that currently employ 
120 
 
them. In view of this, there are no specific improvements required to implement the bag 
barrier passive explosion mitigation system into U.S. coal mines. 
Some design or layout changes may be required to implement this system into 
U.S. mines due to the difference in ventilation and mining practices. For example, more 
bags in more locations are required for room and pillar mines versus longwall mines due 
to the additional entries and large openings required for this type of mining. Additionally, 
U.S. longwall mines use a minimum of three entries per gate road (intake, return, and 
neutral or belt road), while foreign longwall mines typically use two entries. This also 
requires additional barriers and bags. The use of bleeder entries in U.S. longwall mines 
yields the need for additional barrier locations to protect those from possible explosion 
propagation as well. 
While there were no technical obstacles uncovered that would prevent the 
implementation of the bag barrier system into U.S. coal mines, this study did uncover 
many differences that need to be researched further.  Many of these differences will be 
site specific factors that must be carefully considered, organized, researched, accounted, 
and planned for in the selection of barrier placement and design. This is a similar process 
to that which is used by each mine that is required to employ explosion barriers in every 
foreign country that requires them. Therefore, bag barrier implementation becomes an 
economic evaluation of the technical costs of implementation at each independent mine 
site. 
6.3. PROJECT CONCLUSIONS 
The main goals of this project were to introduce a well-tested and widely utilized 
(internationally) explosion mitigation strategy to the U.S. coal mining industry, and to 
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instigate conversations between coal industry researchers, regulators, and producers 
regarding the need for additional safety measures concerning explosion risks in U.S. 
underground coal mines. In the simplest context, these goals were accomplished through: 
• Explosive testing of the barrier bags that when plotted on a pressure-
impulse diagram clearly define the pressure sensitive and dynamically 
sensitive regions of damage for the bags, and highlights their operational 
characteristics for further study. 
• Long-term moisture intrusion study of the bags under extreme conditions 
of temperature and humidity swings indicate that no significant moisture 
intrusion into the bags occurs, the enclosed dust remains dry with no 
caking, and therefore dust dispersal will not be affected by bag use in wet, 
humid coal mine environments. 
• Trial installations of bag barriers in operating coal mines in the Eastern 
United States that prove their implementation is feasible in most medium 
height coal mines in the U.S. 
• Surveys of miners before and after the bag barrier installations in their 
mines, and after a month of working around the bag barriers indicate that 
they understand the explosion risks inherent to coal mining and would like 
to see more safeguards in place to prevent them. Additionally, the miners 
liked the bag barrier system and felt safer with them in place. 
The introduction and regulation of explosion barriers in the United States is a very 
dynamic subject requiring multi-faceted analysis. These analyses must be continued 
beyond the scope of this project for the full impact of this project to be realized. It is 
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understood that the American regulatory system does not provide for a risk-based 
approach to the management of hazards in coal mines. However, based on the multi-
national use of a proven explosion mitigation system implemented via risk based 
assessments, the feedback received from U.S. miners that indicates their desire for 
additional safeguards against explosion hazards, and the results of the testing performed 
here that outlines the operational characteristics of the barrier bags, it would seem 
prudent for MSHA to at least allow the use of this additional layer of defense against coal 
mine explosions. In the absence of specific legislation regarding the implementation and 
required installation locations of explosion barriers in U.S. mines, a risk based approach 
is the only applicable method for interested mines to implement the bag barrier system 
and utilize this extra layer of protection in their mine.  
In closing, the words written in the 1928 USBM Report 277 by a coal dust 
explosion research pioneer, George S. Rice of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, still ring true 
today. He stated, “Although everyone hopes that the employment of all known 
preventative methods will minimize the mine explosions and fires that entrap men, no 
mine operator is justified in assuming that no unusual occurrence, careless act, or mistake 
will ever cause a disastrous fire or explosion in his mine.” On this account it is advisable 
to employ any and all means necessary to prevent coal dust explosions and their 
destruction in the United States as it is in other countries. The allowed implementation of 
the widespread use of explosion barriers in coal mines in the United States as an 
assurance against the unthinkable failure of the other methods of prevention, or the 




6.4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
To continue this work and further the understanding and implementation of 
explosion barriers in underground coal mines in the U.S., further research is 
recommended. Many questions arose during this project that were outside the scope of 
this project. This gave rise to many additional areas of research interest. The areas of this 
future research should include: 
• The appropriate location/placement of passive and active explosion barriers in 
U.S. mines based on disaster reports and coal dust fallout survey data 
• Active explosion barrier alternatives, and active explosion barrier triggers, 
suppressants, and dispersion apparatus.  
• The applicability of incorporating explosion barrier systems with in-mine 
monitoring and communication systems  
• Do mines with shorter seam heights need the same distance to the first row of 
bags, since in shorter seam mines the pressure wave and flame front may 
behave differently?  
• Can short seam height mines concentrate the bags towards the ribs to save 
space in the center of the roadway for equipment clearance? 
• Can the bag height be reduced by having less air-space or contained dust and 
bag row and spacing be closer together to compensate?  
• Is there a concern with the flammability of the bags and is further testing 
required to satisfy MSHA?  














MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT UTILIZED IN OPEN AIR TESTING 














The contents of Appendix A. include a listing of the equipment and materials 
required to complete the 60, 120, and 240-gram C4 open-air testing of the barrier bags at 
the Missouri S&T Experimental Mine Facility’s Blast Test Pad. 
• PPE (Hard Hats, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection) 
• Digital Camera 
• Remote Trigger Box and Interface Cable 
• Data Acquisition System 
• 6 Piezoelectric Pressure Transducers 
• 6 Pressure Transducer Coax Cables 
• 6 Pressure Transducer/Bag Hanger Stands 
• 6 Stand Weight Buckets 
• 24 Skillpro Stone Dust Bags 
• Charge Hanging Stand 
• 2 Power Extension Cords 
• Scorpion Initiation Box 
• Blasting Cable Reel 
• Trigger Cable Reel 
• 1 Roll Wire – Charge Hanging 
• Extra Electrical Wire for Cap Mounted Triggers 
• 1 Roll Electrical Tape 
• Tape Measure 
• Table 
• #8 Blasting Caps (electric) – Qty:3 
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• 60-gram Spherical C4 Charge – Qty:1 
• 120-gram Spherical C4 Charge – Qty:1 
• 240-gram Spherical C4 Charge – Qty:1 
• 2 Barricades and Warning Signs 
• Phantom High-Speed Camera and Tripod 












































The information contained in Appendix B. includes a screen shot of the actual 
Synergy Data Acquisition System pressure transducer waveform for the 60, 120, and 
240-gram C4 open air tests. Additionally, individual pressure versus time graphs for each 
of the six pressure transducer locations and distances are given for each test. Figures B1 - 
B1.6 contain pressure versus time graphs from the 60-gram C4 test; Figures B2 - B2.6 
contain them for the 120-gram C4 test; and Figures B3 - B3.6 contain them for the 240-
gram C4 test. 
 
 
Figure B1: 60-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Waveforms 
 
 




Figure B1.2: 60-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #2 (7 feet) 
 
 
Figure B1.3: 60-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #3 (9 feet) 
 
 




B1.5. 60-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #5 (13 feet) 
 
 
Figure B1.6: 60-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #6 (15 feet) 
 
 




Figure B2.1: 120-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #1 (5 feet) 
 
 
Figure B2.2: 120-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #2 (7 feet) 
 
 




Figure B2.4: 120-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #4 (11 feet) 
 
 
Figure B2.5: 120-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #5 (13 feet) 
 
 




Figure B3: 240-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Waveforms 
 
 
Figure B3.1: 240-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #1 (5 feet) 
 
 




Figure B3.3: 240-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #3 (9 feet) 
 
 
Figure B3.4: 240-gram C4 Charge Pressure versus Time Graph Sensor #4 (11 feet) 
 
 














































The figures contained within Appendix C. are photographic exhibits of the barrier 
bag damage resulting from the open air and shock tunnel testing. Each is labeled with its 
testing charge weight, and bag location position and distance from the charge. Figures C1 
through C1.6 contain images from the open-air testing, while Figures C2 through C2.2 
contain images from the shock tunnel testing. 
 
  




Figure C1.1: 120g C4 Test Bag Position 2 (7 ft) 
 
 




Figure C1.3: 240g Shot - Bag Positions 1 and 2 (5 and 7 ft) 
 
 




Figure C1.5: 240g C4 Test Bag Position 4 (11 ft) 
 
 




Figure C2: 40g C4 Test Bag Distance 31 feet 
 
 












































The contents of Appendix D include a listing of the equipment and materials 
required to complete the 40-gram C4 shock tunnel testing of the barrier bags at the 
Missouri S&T Experimental Mine Facility’s Shock Testing Tunnel. 
• PPE (Hard Hats, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection) 
• Digital Camera 
• Remote Trigger Box and Interface Cable 
• Data Acquisition System 
• 6 Piezoelectric Pressure Transducers 
• 6 Pressure Transducer Coax Cables 
• 6 Pressure Transducer Stands 
• 4 Skillpro Stone Dust Bags 
• 2 Power Extension Cords 
• Scorpion Initiation Box 
• Blasting Cable Reel 
• Trigger Cable Reel 
• 1 Roll Wire – Charge Hanging 
• Extra Electrical Wire for Cap Mounted Triggers 
• 1 Roll Electrical Tape 
• Tape Measure 
• Table 
• #8 Blasting Caps (electric) – Qty:4 




• 2 Barricades and Warning Signs 
• GoPro Camera and Tripod 















































The contents of Appendix E include two tables containing the pressure and 
impulse data versus sensor location and charge distance of the shock tunnel pressure 
testing performed during this project. 
 
Table E1: Shock Tunnel Pressure Testing Pressure Data 
 
 

































A Bag Barrier supplies calculator spreadsheet was developed, based on the UK 
regulations, to quickly output the maximum number of bags, hooks, and stone dust 
amount required to install a bag barrier system in a given mine. Also, the number of rows 
of bags, and the number of bags per row for different barrier configurations was also 
output. This was done by inputting mine tunnel dimensions and bag spacing information. 
Included in this Appendix are copies of the completed calculator spreadsheet for both 








































ENDING LIMESTONE DUST MOISTURE CONTENT ANALYSIS 













An investigation into the barrier bags’ ability to prevent moisture contamination 
of the enclosed stone dust was undertaken. Thirty-five bags were filled and hung at the 
Missouri University of Science and Technology’s Experimental Mine for a full year. The 
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